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ABSTRACT
Together with the massive and rapid evolution of computer networks, there has been a surge
of research interest and activity surrounding network security recently. A secure network has
to provide users with confidentiality, authentication, data integrity and nonrepudiation, and
availability and access control, among other features. With the evolution of current attacks
and the emergence of new attacks, in addition to traditional countermeasures, networked
systems have to adopt more quantitative approaches to guarantee these features. In response
to this need, we study in this thesis several quantitative approaches based on decision theory
and game theory for network security.
We first examine decentralized detection problems with a finite number of sensors making
conditionally correlated measurements regarding several hypotheses. Each sensor sends to
a fusion center an integer from a finite alphabet, and the fusion center makes a decision
on the actual hypothesis based on the messages it receives from the sensors. We show that
when the observations are conditionally dependent, the Bayesian probability of error can no
longer be expressed as a function of the marginal probabilities. We then characterize this
probability of error based on the set of joint probabilities of the sensor messages. We show
that there exist optimal solutions under both Bayesian and Neyman-Pearson formulations,
in the general case as well as in the special case where the sensors are restricted to threshold
rules based on likelihood ratios. We provide an enumeration method to search for the optimal
thresholds, which works for both the case where sensor observations are given as probability
density functions and the case where they are given as probability mass functions. This
search algorithm is applied to a dataset extracted from TCP dump data to detect attacks
from regular connections.
We also study two-player classical and stochastic fictitious play processes which can be
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viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games between an Attacker and a Defender.
Players do not have access to each other’s payoff matrix. Each has to observe the other’s
actions up to the present and plays the action generated based on the best response to these
observations. However, when the game is played over a communication network, there are
several practical issues that need to be taken into account: First, the players may make
random decision errors from time to time. Second, the players’ observations of each other’s
previous actions may be incorrect. The players will try to compensate for these errors based
on the information they have. We examine the convergence property of the game in such
scenarios, and establish convergence to the equilibrium point under some mild assumptions
when both players are restricted to two actions. We also propose and establish the local
stability property of a modified version of stochastic fictitious play where the frequency
update is time-invariant. We then apply a fictitious play algorithm in the push-back defense
against DDoS attacks and observe the convergence to a Nash equilibrium of the static game.
We finally formulate the security problem on a network with multiple nodes as a two-
player stochastic game between the Attacker and the Defender. We propose a linear model
to quantify the interdependency among constituent nodes in terms of security assets and
vulnerability. This model is general enough to address the differences in security asset
valuation between the Attacker and the Defender, as well as the costs of attacking and
defending. We solve the game using an iterative algorithm when the game is zero-sum and
using a nonlinear program in the general case when the game is nonzero-sum. The solutions
provide the players with the optimal stationary strategies at each state of the network and
the overall payoffs of the game. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate our model.
Our analyses and designs in this thesis thus cover multiple components of the decision
making and resource allocation processes in a network intrusion detection and prevention
system. They are meant to complement current research in network security with some
quantitative approaches, in order to detect, prevent, and counter attacks more effectively.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Together with the massive and rapid evolution of computer networks, there has been a surge
of research interest and activity surrounding network security recently. Today’s attackers
are much smarter and more computationally powerful than their predecessors, thanks to the
rapid progress of electronic and computer engineering. The ubiquitous Internet, empowered
by state-of-the-art routers, high-bandwidth connections, and advanced access technologies,
which provides users with never-before-seen data rates and flexibility, unfortunately, also fur-
nishes attackers with the tools to carry out more distributed, more destructive, and stealthier
assaults on networked targets. A secure network has to provide users with confidentiality, au-
thentication, data integrity and nonrepudiation, and availability and access control, among
other features [1, 2]. Nowadays, with the evolution of current attacks and the emergence of
new attacks, in addition to traditional countermeasures, networked systems have to adopt
more quantitative approaches to guarantee these features.
In response to this need, we study in this thesis several quantitative approaches based on
decision theory and game theory for network security. On the one hand, when dealing with
theories, we take into account specific conditions and ramifications that arise in the context
of network security in order to come up with meaningful results. One the other hand,
the analyses and the models are meant to be general enough to be applicable to a wide
range of network security problems, whether they arise in wired or wireless networks. We
do, however, attempt to apply the theoretical results to specific network security problems
whenever possible. That way, we hope to be able to first verify the theoretical findings using
real-world problems, and then observe the complications that may lessen the impact and use
of these theories.
While network security, which spans all the layers of the Open Systems Interconnection
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model, is a collection of many different subjects of study, from cryptography to security
protocols, from hardware security to resource allocation, from dependability to privacy [3,4],
we restrict ourselves to a class of network security problems that deal with decision making
and resource allocation. The results thus will be better comprehended from a systemic point
of view. We assume a very dynamic environment and sophisticated players who can allot
their resources across multiple heterogeneous targets and adjust their strategies over time.
We then impose practical constraints arising from limited communication bandwidths and
the imperfection of the decision and observation processes. We also take into account the
correlation among the observations from different agents and the interdependency among all
the nodes in a network.
In this dissertation, we first look at the problem of detecting attacks in a networked sys-
tem (Chapter 2). This is considered to be the task of the network intrusion detection (and
prevention) system (IDS – IDPS). Although an IDS (IDPS) could be either host-based or
network-based, in this work we generally use the term IDS (IDPS) to refer to a network
intrusion detection system (network intrusion detection and prevention system). Intrusion
detection approaches are normally classified into two categories: anomaly detection and mis-
use detection. In anomaly detection, the IDS characterizes the correct and/or acceptable
behavior of the system to detect wrongful behavior. Misuse detection, in contrast, uses
known patterns of penetration/attack to detect intrusion. These approaches, while working
well with attacks whose attributes are remarkably different from regular traffic (for anomaly
detection), or with attacks that follow fixed patterns in terms of protocols and traffic fea-
tures (for misuse detection), fall short of dealing with attackers who can adjust their traffic
parameters in more flexible manners. We thus examine in this work the use of hypothesis
testing for attack detection. In hypothesis testing-based approaches, one generally has to
characterize both regular traffic and attacks in terms of parameter distributions. These ap-
proaches can thus be considered to lie somewhere in between anomaly detection and misuse
detection [4].
Three formulations that are most widely used in hypothesis testing are Bayesian, minimax,
and Neyman-Pearson. In Bayesian hypothesis testing, we are given prior distributions (of
some parameters) of the hypotheses, and based on the observations of these parameters,
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we pick a hypothesis that minimizes the average cost. An alternative formulation that is
used when the prior distributions are unknown is the minimax approach, where we minimize
the maximum of the conditional costs given each hypothesis. If a cost structure is not well
defined or is not available, we can use the Neyman-Pearson formulation, where we minimize
the miss probability given an upper bound on the false alarm probability.
We specifically study a decentralized hypothesis testing architecture where multiple sen-
sors observe the same event or different parameters of the same event. The sensors then
send summaries of their observations (instead of full observations, due to communication
constraints) to a fusion center, which finally picks a hypothesis. In such a configuration, if
the sensor observations are assumed to be conditionally independent given each hypothesis,
it has been shown in [5] that there exists an optimal solution over the Cartesian product
of the sets of conditional marginal probabilities of sensor observations. However, in several
applications of hypothesis testing such as sensor networks and attack/anomaly detection,
it is generally seen that the observations from different sensors may be correlated (see, for
example, [6–9]). Here we show that when the observations are conditionally dependent,
the Bayesian probability of error can no longer be expressed as a function of the marginal
probabilities. We then characterize this probability based on the set of joint probabilities
of the sensor messages. We show that there exist optimal solutions under both Bayesian
and Neyman-Pearson formulations, in the general case as well as in the special case where
the sensors are restricted to threshold rules based on likelihood ratios. We provide an enu-
meration method to search for the optimal thresholds, which works for both the case where
sensor observations are given as probability density functions and the case where they are
given as probability mass functions. This search algorithm is applied to the KDD dataset
1999 to detect attacks from regular connections.
We next consider the interaction between an Attacker and a Defender (the IDPS). Each
has at its disposal a finite number of actions to choose from. For the Attacker, each action
could be, say, launching a certain type of attack toward a certain node. For the Defender,
each action could be, say, deploying a certain countermeasure at a certain node. For each
pair of actions of the Attacker and the Defender, if the outcome and the payoff (or the loss) of
each party are well defined, we have a game situation. When both players play their actions
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simultaneously and only once, we have a noncooperative static bi-matrix game [10,11], which
has been examined extensively in the context of network security [3,4]. For this kind of game,
if the payoff matrices are known to both players, each player can compute the set of Nash
equilibria of the game and play one of these strategies to maximize its expected gain (or
minimize its expected loss).
Now suppose that the game is repeated over and over again, and the players do not have
full knowledge of each other’s payoff function. One thing each player can do is to observe
the actions of her opponent and play the action (or a mix of actions) that maximizes her
own accumulated payoff. This turns out to be a well-known mechanism called fictitious
play that was originally used to compute Nash equilibria in matrix games. When such a
security game is played over a network, in order to have a good model, we have to take into
account several practical issues. First, the players may make random decision errors from
time to time. Instead of playing (with probability 1) an action which is the output of the
best-response computation, a player may play another action with some probability (which
is typically small for functional systems). Second, the observation that each player makes on
her opponent’s actions may also be incorrect, which will definitely affect her own responding
actions. There are many factors giving rise to these problems: the non-ideality of electronic
and software systems, the uncertain and noisy characteristics of observation data, and the
erroneous nature of the channels on which commands and observations are communicated,
to name a few. These are the problems that we address in Chapter 3. Specifically, we
quantify and study the deviation of Nash equilibrium strategies in the presence of decision
and observation errors, depending on the players’ levels of awareness of these errors.
Finally, Chapter 4 is focused on the stochastic security game on a network with interde-
pendent nodes. The game is still defined between two players: an Attacker and a Defender
(the IDS). The nodes are generally of different values to each player. Each individual node is
also valued differently by the Attacker and the Defender. The Attacker can launch different
types of attacks such as DoS, port-scanning, and malware toward a particular node. The
Defender has to monitor to detect attacks and can also take actions to recover a node such
as scanning for malware and patching security breaches. We address the interdependency
among nodes in two aspects: security assets and vulnerabilities. Not only does one node’s
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security asset depend on its own well-being, it also depends on the states of other nodes
in the network. Also, a node tends to be more vulnerable to attacks if some of its neigh-
bors have been compromised. Taking heterogeneity and interdependency into account, each
player has to figure out what is the best strategy to employ at each state of the network.
In this work we attempt to answer this question using the frameworks of both nonzero-sum
and zero-sum stochastic games.
Our analyses and designs in this thesis thus cover multiple components of the decision
making and resource allocation processes in a network intrusion detection and prevention
system. They are meant to complement current research in network security with some
quantitative approaches, in order to detect, prevent, and counter attacks more effectively.
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CHAPTER 2
DECENTRALIZED DETECTION WITH
CONDITIONALLY DEPENDENT OBSERVATIONS
2.1 Introduction
Decentralized hypothesis testing has been examined in many papers and texts (see, for
example, [5, 12–15]). In a decentralized configuration, to enhance the reliability of the test,
a number of sensors observe the same event or different aspects of an event. These sensors
then send summaries of their observations (instead of full observations, due to communication
constraints) to a fusion center, which finally picks a hypothesis based on a given criterion (e.g.
Bayesian, minimax, or Neyman-Pearson). In such a configuration, if the sensor observations
are assumed to be conditionally independent given each hypothesis, it has been shown in [5]
that there exists an optimal solution over the Cartesian product of the sets of conditional
marginal probabilities of sensor observations.
However, in several applications of hypothesis testing such as sensor networks and at-
tack/anomaly detection, it is generally seen that the observations from different sensors may
be correlated (see, for example, [6–9]). Here we first show that when the observations are
conditionally dependent, the Bayesian probability of error, Pe, can no longer be expressed
as a function of the marginal probabilities. We then characterize Pe based on the set of joint
probabilities of the sensor messages. We show that there exist optimal solutions under both
Bayesian and Neyman-Pearson formulations, in the general case as well as in the special case
where the sensors are restricted to threshold rules based on likelihood ratios. We provide
an enumeration method to search for the optimal thresholds, which works for both the case
where sensor observations are given as probability density functions and the case where they
are given as probability mass functions. This search algorithm is applied to the KDD dataset
1999 to detect attacks from regular connections.
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This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we formulate the problem and specify
the decision rules of the sensors and the fusion rule of the fusion center. Next, in Section
2.3, we establish the existence of optimal solutions for both Bayesian and Neyman-Pearson
formulations in the case where sensor observations are conditionally correlated. We provide
in Section 2.4 an example where the joint densities1 of the sensor observations are bivariate
normal. We also propose an enumeration method to search for the optimal (Bayesian)
thresholds for the general case of conditionally correlated observations, provided that the
sensors are restricted to use likelihood ratio tests. We then apply decentralized hypothesis
testing to intrusion detection, where each sensor observes a parameter of the system or
current connection. We also derive some relationships between the majority vote and the
likelihood ratio test for a parallel configuration in Section 2.5. We provide the enumeration
algorithm in detail in Section 2.6. Finally, Section 2.7 gives a brief overview of the KDD
1999 dataset [17] and presents the simulation results using this dataset.
2.2 Decentralized hypothesis testing with non-i.i.d. observations
In this section, we formulate the problem of decentralized hypothesis testing with non-i.i.d
observations. We first discuss centralized detection before proceeding with the decentralized
problem in Subsection 2.2.1. Extensive discussion of both models can be found in [12]. In
Subsection 2.2.2, we provide details on the fusion rule and the average probability of error
at the fusion center.
2.2.1 From centralized to decentralized detection
Centralized detection. First we consider the configuration given in Figure 2.1. This is a
parallel configuration with a finite number of sensors and a data fusion center. The sensors
observe M hypotheses (M ≥ 2), H0, H1 . . . , HM−1, whose prior probabilities π0, π1 . . . , πM−1
are known. The observations of the sensors are Y1, Y2, . . . , YN , where Yj is a random variable
1Following [16], in this chapter, we will use the term density for both the probability density function and
the probability mass function.
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that takes values in an appropriately defined finite or infinite set Yj, j = 1, . . . , N . Given
hypothesis Hi, the joint probability density function (or joint probability mass function)
of the observations is Pi(y1, . . . , yN), where i = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1. Sensor observations are
not assumed to be conditionally independent or identically distributed. In this model, it is
assumed that the fusion center has full access to the observations of the sensors. It then
fuses all the data to finally decide which hypothesis is true. From the result of centralized
Bayesian hypothesis testing [16], the rules for the case of binary hypotheses (M = 2) can be
stated as follows:
γ0(y1, y2, . . . yN) =
 1 if
P1(y1,y2,...yN )
P0(y1,y2,...yN )
≥ π0
π1
0 otherwise,
(2.1)
where γ0 is the fusion rule at the fusion center. We use the indices of the hypotheses (0, 1)
to indicate the hypotheses (H0, H1) in the equations. Note that the fusion rule involves a
threshold which is the ratio of π0 to π1, and the likelihood ratio (ratio of probabilities under
the two hypotheses) is tested against that threshold. For the case M > 2, details can be
found in [18] (Section 2.3).
{H0, . . . , HM−1}
Sensor 1
Sensor 2
Sensor N
PY1,Y2,...,YN |Hi(y1, y2, . . . , yn)
Y1
Y2
YN
Fusion Center, γ0
Figure 2.1: Centralized detection, where the fusion center has full access to the
observations of the sensors.
Decentralized detection. Now we consider the decentralized Bayesian detection problem
with a parallel configuration. Each sensor uses a decision rule, which is a map γj : Yj 7→
{0, 1, . . . , D−1}, and then sends the resulting message, which is an integer dj ∈ {0, 1, . . . , D−
1}, to the fusion center. We take the communication channels between the sensors and the
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fusion center to be perfect. At the fusion center, a fusion rule γ0 : {0, 1, . . . , D − 1}
N 7→
{0, 1 . . . ,M − 1} is employed to finally decide which hypothesis is true. The configuration
of the N sensors and the fusion center is shown in Figure 2.2.
replacemen
{H0, . . . , HM−1}
γ1(.)
γ2(.)
γN (.)
PY1|Hi(y)
PYN |Hi(y)
d1
dN
Fusion Center, γ0(.)
Figure 2.2: Decentralized hypothesis testing with N sensors and a fusion center.
Naturally, given the same a priori probabilities of the hypotheses and conditional joint
distributions of the observations, the decentralized configuration will yield an average prob-
ability of error that is higher than or equal to that of the centralized configuration. The
reason is that we lose some information after the quantization at the sensors [12]. Putting
it another way, given the observations of the sensors and assuming the use of a likelihood
ratio test at the fusion center in the centralized configuration, the test in (2.1) will yield the
minimum probability of error. The decentralized configuration, however, can always be con-
sidered as a special setup of the fusion center in the centralized case, where the observations
from the sensors are quantized before being fused together.
For this decentralized detection problem, under the assumption that the observations are
conditionally independent, it has been shown in [12] that there exists an optimal solution
for the local sensors, which is a deterministic (likelihood ratio) threshold strategy. When
the observations are conditionally dependent, however, the threshold rule is no longer nec-
essarily optimal [12]. In this case, obtaining the overall optimal non-threshold rule is a
very challenging problem. In view of this, for the search algorithm, we restrict ourselves to
threshold-type rules (which are suboptimal) at the local sensors and seek optimality within
that restricted class. The optimal fusion rule, as shown next, will also be a likelihood ratio
test.
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When each sensor is restricted to the threshold rule, it can be considered as a quantizer.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, [5] characterizes these quantizers based on the set of marginal
distributions of the messages given each hypothesis. Following [5], let
qd(γj|Hi) = Pr(γj(Yj) = d|Hi), i = 0, . . . ,M − 1,
j = 1, . . . , N, d = 0, . . . , D − 1. (2.2)
For any γj ∈ Γj, where Γj is the set of all deterministic quantizers for sensor j, let
q(γj|Hi) = (q0(γj|Hi), . . . , qD−1(γj|Hi)). (2.3)
Define the vector q(γj) ∈ R
MD, for any γj ∈ Γj, as
q(γj) = (q(γj|H0), . . . , q(γj|HM−1)). (2.4)
Now a quantizer can be represented by its vector q(γ) for the purpose of detecting the
hypotheses. Let
Qj = {q(γj) : γj ∈ Γj}. (2.5)
For a parallel configuration with N sensors, we define
q(γ1, γ2, . . . , γN) = (q(γ1), q(γ2), . . . , q(γN)) . (2.6)
Then we have q(γ1, γ2, . . . , γN) ∈ Qa, where Qa is the Cartesian product of all Qj, j =
1, . . . , N : Qa = ×
N
j=1Qj.
As previously mentioned, it has been proved in [5] that Qj is a compact set, and thus
any cost function that is a continuous function on Qj will attain a minimum. In a parallel
configuration with multiple sensors and a fusion center, if the sensor observations are inde-
pendent given each hypothesis, it has also been shown that there exists an optimal solution
over the set Qa [5].
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2.2.2 Decision rules at the sensors and the fusion center
First we define two classes of decision rules at each sensor and the fusion center. (A fusion
center can also be viewed as a sensor; thus we use the term “sensor” to refer to both in
this subsection.) A general rule is one in which the observation space is partitioned into
M regions, Ri, i = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1, and the sensor will pick Hi if Y ∈ Ri. We define the
threshold rule for the case of binary hypotheses (M = 2) as follows. A threshold rule is a
general rule where
R1 =
{
y ∈ Y :
P1(y)
P0(y)
≥ τ
}
(2.7)
R0 =
{
y ∈ Y :
P1(y)
P0(y)
< τ
}
, (2.8)
where Y is the observation space of the sensor, and P0(y) and P1(y) are the conditional
distributions of the observation given H0 and H1, respectively.
Assuming uniform costs, the Bayes risk will become the average probability of error [16].
As mentioned above, the fusion center can be considered as a sensor with the observation
being (d1, d2, . . . , dN). Note that we seek a joint optimization of the decision rules at the
(local) sensors and the fusion rules at the fusion center to minimize the Bayes risk. However,
if the decision rules at the (local) sensors have already been optimized, the fusion rule at
the fusion center must be the solution to the centralized detection problem to minimize the
Bayes risk. From [16], the fusion rule for binary hypotheses can be written as a likelihood
ratio test:
γ0(d1, d2, . . . , dN) =
 1 if
P1(d1,d2,...,dN )
P0(d1,d2,...,dN )
≥ π0
π1
0 otherwise,
(2.9)
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and the corresponding average probability of error at the fusion center is given as
Pe = π0P0
(
La ≥
π0
π1
)
+ π1P1
(
La <
π0
π1
)
= π0
∑
(d1,d2,...,dN ):La≥
pi0
pi1
P0(d1, d2, . . . , dN) + π1
∑
(d1,d2,...,dN ):La<
pi0
pi1
P1(d1, d2, . . . , dN)
where La =
P1(d1, d2, . . . , dN)
P0(d1, d2, . . . , dN)
. (2.10)
Here Pi(d1, d2, . . . , dN), i = 0, 1, are the conditional joint probability density functions (given
Hi) of the sensor messages, which can be computed as
Pi(d1, d2, . . . , dN) =
∫
R
(N)
dN
. . .
∫
R
(1)
d1
Pi(y1, . . . , yN)dy1 . . . dyN , (2.11)
where dj = 0, 1, . . . , D − 1 and R
(j)
dj
is the region where sensor j decides to send message
dj, j = 1, . . . , N . Thus, it can be seen that in the optimal solution (which achieves the
minimum Pe) the fusion rule is always a likelihood ratio test (2.9), but the decision rules
at the local sensors can be general rules. It has been shown in [12] that when the sensor
observations are independent given each hypothesis, the optimal solution can be achieved
with the decision rule at each sensor being also a threshold rule. However, when the sensor
observations are conditionally dependent, the threshold rules at the local sensors can no
longer achieve the minimum Pe in general [12]. It is also worth noting that, in general, the
minimum Pe at the fusion center only depends on the decision rules at the sensors. If we
restrict the sensors to threshold rules, the minimum Pe will only depend on the thresholds
at the sensors, {τ1, τ2, . . . , τN}.
The Fusion Rule and the Average Probability of Error for the Discrete Case
We now consider the case where the conditional joint probabilities of the observations are
given as probability mass functions (pmf s). We restrict ourselves to binary hypothesis testing
(M = 2) and the threshold rule, where each sensor makes a local decision on the hypotheses
(D = 2). Again, for each combination of the thresholds at the sensors {τ1, τ2, . . . , τN}, the
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fusion rule (γ0) is determined based on the likelihood ratio test at the fusion center:
γ0(l1, l2, . . . , lN ) =
 1 if
P1(l1,l2,...,lN )
P0(l1,l2,...,lN )
≥ π0
π1
0 otherwise.
(2.12)
Here Pi(l1, l2, . . . , lN) is the conditional joint probability mass function (pmf ) given Hi,
i = 0, 1.
The minimum average probability of error at the fusion center is then given by:
Pe = π0P0
(
P1(l1, l2, . . . , lN )
P0(l1, l2, . . . , lN )
≥
π0
π1
)
+ π1P1
(
P1(l1, l2, . . . , lN)
P0(l1, l2, . . . , lN)
<
π0
π1
)
= π0
∑
l1,l2,...,lN :La≥
pi0
pi1
P0(l1, l2, . . . , lN) + π1
∑
l1,l2,...,lN :La<
pi0
pi1
P1(l1, l2, . . . , lN )
where La =
P1(l1, l2, . . . , lN )
P0(l1, l2, . . . , lN )
. (2.13)
As we are considering the discrete case, where the conditional joint probability functions are
given as pmf s, the conditional joint pmf s of the local decisions can be written as
Pi(l1, l2, . . . , lN) =
∑
YN∈R
(N)
lN
. . .
∑
Y1∈R
(1)
l1
Pi(y1, y2, . . . , yN), (2.14)
where lj = 0, 1, and R
(j)
lj
is the region where Sensor j decides to send bit lj, j = 1, . . . , N :
R
(j)
1 =
{
Yj ∈ Yj : Lyj =
P1(yj)
P0(yj)
≥ τj
}
(2.15)
R
(j)
0 =
{
Yj ∈ Yj : Lyj =
P1(yj)
P0(yj)
< τj
}
, (2.16)
where Lyj = P1(yj)/P0(yj) is the likelihood ratio at Sensor j.
Our goal is to find the combination {τ1, τ2, . . . , τN} that yields the minimum probability of
error at the fusion center. If the number of threshold candidates for every sensor is finite, the
number of combinations of thresholds will also be finite. Then there is an optimal solution,
i.e., a combination of thresholds {τ1, τ2, . . . , τN} that yields the minimum probability of error.
In Section 2.6, we show how to pick the threshold candidates for each sensor.
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2.3 The existence of optimal solutions
2.3.1 Bayesian formulation
In this section, we first prove that when the observations are conditionally dependent, Pe
can no longer be expressed as a function of the marginal distributions of the messages from
the sensors. We then characterize Pe based on the set of joint distributions of the sensor
messages. We show that this set is compact and there exists an optimal solution (that
minimizes Pe) when general rules are used at the sensors, and there also exists an optimal
solution when the sensors are restricted to threshold rules. Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 are
stated for D = 2 and M = 2, but their results can be extended to M > 2.
Proposition 2.1. Let f0(y1, y2) and f1(y1, y2) be two nonidentical joint probability density
functions, where fi(y1, y2), i = 0, 1, is continuous on R
2 and nonzero for −∞ < y1, y2 <∞.
Let Φi(y1, y2), i = 0, 1, denote the corresponding cumulative distribution functions. Let
α0 = Φ0(y
∗
1, y
∗
2) =
∫ y∗1
−∞
∫ y∗2
−∞
f0(y1, y2)dy2dy1, (2.17)
α1 = Φ1(y
∗
1, y
∗
2) =
∫ y∗1
−∞
∫ y∗2
−∞
f1(y1, y2)dy2dy1, (2.18)
where (y∗1, y
∗
2) is an arbitrary point in R
2. Then, specifying a value for α0 ∈ (0, 1) does not
uniquely determine the value of α1, and vice versa.
Proof. The functions f0(y1, y2) and f1(y1, y2) and the values α0 and α1 are illustrated in
Figure 2.3. Let gi(y1) and hi(y2) be the marginal densities of y1 and y2 given Hi, where
i = 0, 1. For each 0 < α0 < 1, we can pick γ0 > 0 such that α0 + γ0 < 1. As the
conditional marginal density g0(y1) is continuous, we can always uniquely pick y
∗
1 such
that
∫ y∗1
−∞
g0(y1)dy1 = α0 + γ0. Once y
∗
1 is specified, we can also choose y
∗
2 such that∫ y∗1
−∞
∫ y∗2
−∞
f0(y1, y2)dy2dy1 = α0. Thus, for each fixed value of γ0, we have a unique pair
(y∗1, y
∗
2). It can be seen that there are infinitely many values of γ0 satisfying α0 + γ0 < 1,
each of which yields a different pair (y∗1, y
∗
2). Therefore, specifying a value for α0 ∈ (0, 1)
does not uniquely determine the value of α1, and vice versa, unless f0(y1, y2) and f1(y1, y2)
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are identically equal.
y1
y2
f1(y1, y2)
f0(y1, y2)
Figure 2.3: The values α0 and α1 are integrations of f0(y1, y2) and f1(y1, y2) over the same
region.
Proposition 2.2. Consider a parallel structure as in Figure 2.2 with the number of sensors
N ≥ 2, the number of messages D = 2, and the number of hypotheses M = 2. When the
observations of the sensors are conditionally dependent, there exists a fusion rule γ0 in which
the minimum average probability of error Pe given in (2.10) cannot be expressed solely as a
function of q(γ1, . . . , γN) (given in (2.6)).
Proof. We first prove this proposition for the 2-sensor case and then use induction to extend
the result to N > 2. As before, let d1 and d2 denote the messages that sensor 1 and
sensor 2 send to the fusion center. For notational simplicity, let Pi(l1, l2) denote P (d1 =
l1, d2 = l2|Hi) where l1, l2 ∈ {0, 1}. We have the following linear system of equations with
Pi(0, 0), Pi(0, 1), Pi(1, 0), and Pi(1, 1) as the unknowns.
Pi(0, 0) + Pi(0, 1) = Pi(l1 = 0)
Pi(1, 0) + Pi(1, 1) = Pi(l1 = 1) = 1− Pi(l1 = 0)
Pi(0, 0) + Pi(1, 0) = Pi(l2 = 0)
Pi(0, 1) + Pi(1, 1) = Pi(l2 = 1) = 1− Pi(l2 = 0).
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Note that the matrix of coefficients is singular. Solving this system, we have that
Pi(0, 0) = αi
Pi(0, 1) = Pi(l1 = 0)− αi
Pi(1, 0) = Pi(l2 = 0)− αi
Pi(1, 1) = 1− Pi(l1 = 0)− Pi(l2 = 0) + αi,
where αi, i = 0, 1, corresponding to H0, H1 are real numbers in (0, 1). Now we rewrite (2.10)
for a fixed fusion rule γ0:
Pe = π0
∑
(d1,d2)∈R1
P0(d1, d2) + π1
∑
(d1,d2)∈R0
P1(d1, d2), (2.19)
where R0 and R1 are two partitions of the set of all possible values of (d1, d2) in which the
fusion center decides hypothesis H0 or hypothesis H1 is true, respectively. Now suppose that
the fusion center uses the following fusion rule: It picks 1 if (d1, d2) = (1, 1) and picks 0 for
the remaining three cases. After some manipulation, expression (2.19) becomes
Pe = π0(1− P0(d1 = 0)− P0(d2 = 0) + α0) + π1 (P1(d1 = 0) + P1(d2 = 0)− α1) . (2.20)
From Proposition 2.1, α0 is not uniquely determined given α1 and vice versa. Thus Pe in
(2.19) cannot be expressed solely as a function of q(γ1, γ2).
Now we prove the proposition for N > 2 by induction on N . Suppose that there exists
a fusion rule γ
(N)
0 that results in P
(N)
e that cannot be expressed solely as a function of
q(γ1, . . . , γN); we will then show that there exists a fusion rule γ
(N+1)
0 that yields P
(N+1)
e
that cannot be expressed solely as a function of q(γ1, . . . , γN+1). Let R˜
(N)
0 and R˜
(N)
1 be the
decision regions (for H0 and H1, respectively) at the fusion center when there are N sensors.
Let R˜
(N+1)
0 and R˜
(N+1)
1 be those of the (N + 1)-sensor case. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the observation of sensor (N +1) is independent of those of the first N sensors.
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Rewriting (2.10) for the N -sensor problem, we have that
P (N)e = π0
∑
(l1,...,lN )∈R˜
(N)
1
P0(l1, . . . , lN) + π1
∑
(l1,...,lN )∈R˜
(N)
0
P1(l1, . . . , lN).
Now we construct R˜
(N+1)
0 and R˜
(N+1)
1 based on R˜
(N)
0 and R˜
(N)
1 as follows. R˜
(N+1)
0 consists of
combinations of the forms (l1, . . . , lN , 0) and (l1, . . . , lN , 1) where (l1, . . . , lN ) ∈ R˜
(N)
0 ; R˜
(N+1)
1
consists of combinations of the forms (l1, . . . , lN , 0) and (l1, . . . , lN , 1) where (l1, . . . , lN ) ∈
R˜
(N)
1 . Note that, for i = 0, 1,
Pi(l1, . . . , lN , 0) + Pi(l1, . . . , lN , 1) = Pi(l1, . . . , lN) .
Thus, Pe for the (N + 1)-sensor case can be written as
P (N+1)e = π0
∑
(l1,...,lN ,lN+1)∈R˜
(N+1)
1
P0(l1, . . . , lN , lN+1) + π1
∑
(l1,...,lN ,lN+1)∈R˜
(N+1)
0
P1(l1, . . . , lN+1)
= π0
∑
(l1,...,lN )∈R˜
(N)
1
P0(l1, . . . , lN ) + π1
∑
(l1,...,lN )∈R˜
(N)
0
P1(l1, . . . , lN ) = P
(N)
e .
But P
(N)
e cannot be expressed solely as a function of q(γ1, . . . , γN) and q(γN+1) due to the
induction hypothesis and the independence assumption of sensor (N+1)’s observation. Thus
P
(N+1)
e cannot be expressed solely as a function of q(γ1, . . . , γN+1).
Thus, for the case of conditionally dependent observations, instead of using conditional
marginal distributions, we relate the Bayesian probability of error to the joint densities of the
decisions of the sensors. In what follows, we use γ to collectively denote (γ1, γ2, . . . , γN) and
Γ to denote the Cartesian product of Γ1,Γ2, . . . ,ΓN , where Γj is the set of all deterministic
decision rules (quantizers) of sensor j, j = 1, . . . , N . Also, we define
sd1,...,dN (γ|Hi) = Pr(γ1 = d1, . . . , γN = dN |Hi). (2.21)
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Then, the DN -tuple s(γ|Hi) is defined as
s(γ|Hi) = (s0,0,...,0(γ|Hi), s0,0,...,1(γ|Hi), . . . , sD−1,D−1,...,D−1(γ|Hi)) . (2.22)
Finally, we define the M ×DN -tuple s(γ):
s(γ) = (s(γ|H0), s(γ|H1), . . . , s(γ|HM−1)) . (2.23)
From (2.10), it can be seen that Pe is a continuous function on s(γ) for a fixed fusion rule.
We now prove that the set S = {s(γ) : γ1 ∈ Γ1, . . . , γN ∈ ΓN} is compact, and therefore
there exists an optimal solution for a fixed fusion rule. As the number of fusion rules is
finite, we then can conclude that there exists an optimal solution for the whole system for
each class of decision rules at the sensors.
Theorem 2.1. The set S given by
S = {s(γ) : γ1 ∈ Γ1, γ2 ∈ Γ2, . . . , γN ∈ ΓN} (2.24)
is compact.
Proof. To prove this theorem, we follow the same line of argument as in the proof of compact-
ness of the set of conditional distributions for the one sensor case by Tsitsiklis [5]. Let F be a
σ-algebra on the observation space Y = Y1×Y2×. . .×YN . Denote by Pi, i = 0, 1, . . . ,M−1,
the probability measures on the measurable space (Y ,F) corresponding to hypotheses Hi.
Let P = (P0+ . . .+PM−1)/M ; it can be shown that P is also a probability measure. We use
G to denote the set of all measurable functions from the observation space, Y , into {0, 1}.
Let G(D
N ) denote the Cartesian product of DN replicas of G. The set F is defined as
F =
{
(f00...0, . . . , f(D−1)(D−1)...(D−1)) ∈ G
(DN )
∣∣∣∣∣P
(
D−1∑
d1,...,dN=0
fd1,...,dN (Y ) = 1
)
= 1
}
.
For any γ ∈ Γ and d1, . . . , dN ∈ {0, . . . , D−1}, we define fd1,...,dN such that fd1,...,dN (y) = 1 if
and only if γ(y) = (d1, . . . , dN), and fd1,...,dN (y) = 0 otherwise. Then, fd1,...,dN will be the indi-
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cator function of the set γ−1(d1, . . . , dN). It can be seen that (f00...0, . . . , f(D−1)(D−1)...(D−1)) ∈
F . Also, we have
sd1,...,dN (γ|Hi) = Pr(γ(y) = (d1, . . . , dN)|Hi) =
∫
fd1,...,dN (y)dPi(y). (2.25)
Conversely, for any f = (f00...0, . . . , f(D−1)(D−1)...(D−1)) ∈ F , define γ ∈ Γ as follows:
• If
∑D−1
d1,...,dN=0
fd1,...,dN (y) = 1, then γ(y) = (d1, . . . , dN) such that fd1,...,dN (y) = 1.
• If
∑D
d1,...,dN=1
fd1,...,dN (y) 6= 1, then γ(y) = (0, 0, . . . , 0).
As P
(∑D
d1,...,dN=1
fd1,...,dN (Y ) 6= 1
)
= 0, (2.25) still holds. Now we define a mapping h :
F → RMD
N
such that
hi,d1,...,dN (f) =
∫
fd1,...,dN (y)dPi(y). (2.26)
It can be seen that S = h(F ). If we can find a topology on G in which F is compact and h
is continuous, S will be a compact set.
Let L1(Y ;P) denote the set of all measurable functions f : Y → R that satisfy∫
|f(y)|dP(y) < ∞, and let L∞(Y ;P) denote the set of all measurable functions f : Y → R
such that f is bounded after removing the set Yz ⊂ Y that has P(Yz) = 0. Then G is a
subset of L∞(Y ;P). It is known that L∞(Y ;P) is the dual of L1(Y ;P) [19]. Consider the
weak* topology on L∞(Y ;P), which is the weakest topology where the mapping
f →
∫
f(y)g(y)dP(y) (2.27)
is continuous for every g ∈ L1(Y ;P). Using Alaoglu’s theorem [19], we have that the
unit ball in L∞(Y ;P) is weak*-compact. Thus G is compact. Then G
(DN ), which is a
Cartesian product of DN compact sets, is also compact. Now, from (2.25), every point(
f00...0, . . . , f(D−1)(D−1)...(D−1)
)
∈ F satisfies
∫
A
D−1∑
d1,...,dN=0
fd1,...,dN (y)dP(y) = P(A), (2.28)
where A is any measurable subset of Y . If we let XA denote the indicator function of A, it
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follows that ∫ D−1∑
d1,...,dN=0
fd1,...,dN (y)XA(y)dP(y) = P(A). (2.29)
As XA ∈ L1(Y ;P) and the mapping in (2.27) is continuous for every g ∈ L1(Y ;P), we have
that the map f → P(A) is also continuous. Furthermore, F is a subset of the compact set
G(D
N ), and thus F is also compact.
Let gi, i = 0, . . . ,M − 1 denote the Radon-Nikodym derivative of Pi with respect to P ,
gi(y) =
dPi(y)
dP(y)
. Then we have gi ∈ L1(Y ;P) [5]. Also, we have that
∫
fd1,...,dN (y)dPi(y) =
∫
fd1,...,dN (y)gi(y)dP(y), ∀i, d1, . . . , dN .
From (2.27), (2.30) and the fact that gi ∈ L1(Y ;P), it follows that the mapping f →∫
fd1,...,dN (y)dPi(y) is continuous. Therefore the mapping h given in (2.26) is continuous. As
S = h(F ), we finally have that S is compact.
Theorem 2.2. There exists an optimal solution for the general rules at the sensors, and
there also exists an optimal solution for the special case where the sensors are restricted to
the threshold rules on likelihood ratios.
Proof. For each fixed fusion rule γ0 at the fusion center, the probability of error Pe given in
(2.10) is a continuous function on the compact set S. Thus, by Weierstrass theorem [19],
there exists an optimal solution that minimizes Pe for each γ0. Furthermore, there is a finite
number of fusion rules γ0 at the fusion center (in particular, this is the number of ways to
partition the set {d1, d2, . . . , dN} into two subsets, which is 2
N). Therefore, there exists an
optimal solution over all the fusion rules at the fusion center. Note that the use of the general
rule or the threshold rule will result in different fusion rules, but will not affect the reasoning
in this proof. The optimal solutions in each case, however, will be different in general. More
specifically, the set of all the decision rules (of the sensors) based on the threshold rule will
be a subset of the set of all decision rules (of the sensors); thus, the optimal solution in the
former case will be worse than that of the latter in general.
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2.3.2 Neyman-Pearson formulation
In this section, we examine the decentralized Neyman-Pearson problem for the case M = 2,
i.e., the case where there are only two hypotheses. Consider a finite sequence of deterministic
strategies {γ(k)|k = 1, . . . , K, γ(k) ∈ Γ}. Specifically, γ(k) ≡ {γ(k)1 ∈ Γ1, γ
(k)
2 ∈ Γ2, . . . , γ
(k)
N ∈
ΓN}. Suppose that each deterministic strategy γ
(k) is used with probability 0 < pk ≤ 1,
where
∑K
k=1 pk = 1. Let Γ denote all such randomized strategies. For γ ∈ Γ, we have that
s(γ) =
K∑
k=1
pks(γ
(k)). (2.30)
Note that the set of strategies resulting from this randomization scheme includes (as a subset)
those generated by the “independent randomization” scheme, where the strategies of each
peripheral sensor are randomized independently. From Equation (2.30), it can be seen that
the set S of all such s(γ) is the convex hull of S defined in Equation (2.24), S = co(S). As
shown in Theorem 2.1, S is a finite-dimensional space and clearly bounded. Thus S is also
finite-dimensional and bounded. Furthermore, it is shown in Theorem 2.1 that S is a closed
set. As S is the convex hull of S, it is also a closed set. Thus we can state the following
result:
Proposition 2.3. The set S given by S ≡ {s(γ) : γ ∈ Γ} is compact.
The extension from deterministic strategies to randomized strategies helps accommodate
the Neyman-Pearson test at peripheral sensors. Note that for the Bayesian formulation,
the extension to randomized rules will not improve the optimal solution, as stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2.4. Consider the problem of minimizing the Bayes risk Pe on the set of
randomized rules Γ. There exists an optimal solution that entails deterministic rules at
peripheral sensors.
Proof. Consider a fixed fusion rule, where the Bayes risk is given by
Pe = π0
∑
(d1,...,dN ):(d1,...,dN )∈R1
P0(d1, . . . , dN) + π1
∑
(d1,...,dN ):(d1,...,dN )∈R0
P1(d1, . . . , dN),
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where R0 and R1 are the regions in which the fusion center decides H0 and H1, respectively.
If randomized rules are used at peripheral sensors, the Bayes risk can be written as
Pe = π0
∑
(d1,...,dN ):(d1,...,dN )∈R1
sd1,...,dN (γ|H0) + π1
∑
(d1,...,dN ):(d1,...,dN )∈R0
sd1,...,dN (γ|H1),
where s(γ) is given by
s(γ) =
K∑
k=1
pks(γ
(k)). (2.31)
In particular, we have
sd1,...,dN (γ|Hj) =
K∑
k=1
pksd1,...,dN (γ
(k)|Hj), j = 0, 1. (2.32)
Thus, the Bayes risk is now minimized over the convex hull of K points (s(γ(1)), . . . , s(γ(K))).
Using the fundamental theorem of linear programming (see, for example, [19]), if there is an
optimal solution, there is an optimal solution that is an extreme point of the convex hull,
which corresponds to deterministic rules at the peripheral sensors.
Similar to decentralized Bayesian hypothesis testing, the fusion center can be considered
as a sensor with the observation being d ≡ (d1, d2, . . . , dN). We seek a joint optimization
of the decision rules at the peripheral sensors and the fusion rules at the fusion center to
solve the Neyman-Pearson problem at the fusion center. The decentralized Neyman-Pearson
problem at the fusion center can be stated as follows:
maximize PD(γ0) subject to PF (γ0) ≤ α, 0 < α < 1, (2.33)
where the false alarm probability (PF ) and the detection probability (PD) are given by
PF ≡ P0
(
γ0(d) = 1
)
, (2.34)
PD ≡ P1
(
γ0(d) = 1
)
. (2.35)
Here we have used γ0 to denote the fusion rule at the fusion center. Note that when the
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decision rules at the peripheral sensors have already been optimized, the fusion rule at the
fusion center must be the solution to the centralized Neyman-Pearson detection problem.
Let γ˜0(d) ≡ Pr(γ0(d) = 1|d). From [16], the fusion rule can be written as a likelihood
ratio test:
γ˜0(d) =

1 if P1(d)
P0(d)
> τ
β if P1(d)
P0(d)
= τ
0 if P1(d)
P0(d)
< τ,
(2.36)
where τ is the threshold and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Letting La ≡
P1(d)
P0(d)
, the false alarm probability and
the detection probability resulted from this fusion rule can be written as
PF = P0
(
γ0(d) = 1
)
= P0 (La > τ) + βP0 (La = τ)
=
∑
(d1,...,dN ):La>τ
P0(d) + β
∑
(d1,...,dN ):La=τ
P0(d),
(2.37)
PD = P1
(
γ0(d) = 1
)
= P1 (La > τ) + βP1 (La = τ)
=
∑
(d1,...,dN ):La>τ
P1(d) + β
∑
(d1,...,dN ):La=τ
P1(d).
(2.38)
Here Pi(d) ≡ Pi(d1, d2, . . . , dN), i = 0, 1, are the conditional joint probability density func-
tions (given Hi) of the sensor messages, which can be computed as follows:
Pi(d1, . . . , dN) =
K∑
k=1
pkP
(k)
i (d1, . . . , dN), (2.39)
P
(k)
i (d1, . . . , dN) =
∫
R
(N)
dN
. . .
∫
R
(1)
d1
Pi(y1, . . . , yN)dy1 . . . dyN , (2.40)
where dj = 0, 1, . . . , D− 1 and R
(j)
dj
is the region where sensor j decides to send message dj,
j = 1, . . . , N for the deterministic decision profile γ(k). (Note that the partitions of sensor
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observation spaces on the right hand side of Equation (2.40) are of a specific deterministic
strategy k; however, we have omitted the superscript k to simplify the formula.) Thus, it
can be seen that in the optimal solution, the fusion rule is always a likelihood ratio test
(2.9), but the decision rules at the peripheral sensors can be general rules. We now formally
state the following result.
Theorem 2.3. There exists an optimal solution for the decentralized configuration in Figure
2.2 with the Neyman-Pearson criterion, where the decision rules at peripheral sensors lie in
Γ, and the fusion rule at the fusion center is a standard Neyman-Pearson likelihood ratio
test.
Proof. For each fixed fusion rule γ0 at the fusion center, the false alarm probability PF given
in (2.37) and the detection probability PD given in (2.38) are both continuous functions on
the compact set S. Hence the set Γ
0
≡ {γ ∈ Γ : PF (γ) ≤ α} is also closed and bounded.
Also, recall that Γ is a finite-dimensional space. Thus Γ
0
is a compact set. Therefore, by
Weierstrass theorem [19], there exists an optimal solution that maximizes PD given that
PF ≤ α for each γ0. Furthermore, there is a finite number of fusion rules γ0 at the fusion
center (in particular, this is upper bounded by the number of ways to partition the set
{d1, d2, . . . , dN} into three subsets with La > τ , La = τ , and La < τ , which is 3
N). Note
that once this partition is fixed, τ and β can be calculated accordingly. Therefore, there
exists an optimal solution over all the fusion rules at the fusion center.
In what follows, we introduce a special case where we can further characterize the optimal
solution. First, we present the following definition from [12].
Definition 2.1. A likelihood ratio Lj(yj) is said to have no point mass if
Pr(Lj(yj) = x|Hi) = 0, ∀x ∈ [0,∞], i = 1, 2. (2.41)
It can be seen that this property holds when Pi(yj), i = 1, 2, are both continuous.
Proposition 2.5. If all peripheral sensors are restricted to threshold rules on likelihood
ratios, and Lj(yj), j = 1, . . . , N have no point mass, there exists an optimal solution that is
a deterministic rule at peripheral sensors, that is, γ ∈ Γ.
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Proof. When Lj(yj), j = 1, . . . , N have no point mass, Pr(Lj(yj) = τd) = 0; thus, what
each sensor does at the boundary of decision regions is immaterial.
2.4 A special case with bivariate normal distributions and
simulation results
In this section, we consider a special case with M = 2, N = 2, D = 2, and the joint density
given each hypothesis is bivariate normal. Particularly, let the conditional joint densities of
the observations be f0(y1, y2) (given H0), which is a bivariate normal density with means
µ1 = µ2 = −1, variances σ
2
1 = σ
2
2 = 1, the correlation coefficient ρ = 0.6, and f1(y1, y2)
(given H1), which is also a bivariate normal density, with µ1 = µ2 = 1, σ
2
1 = σ
2
2 = 1, ρ = 0.6.
These two densities are plotted in Figure 2.4. Here, Yj ≡ R, for j = 1, 2. Note that even
when the observations are i.i.d., restricting the sensors to the same decision rules may lead
to a suboptimal solution [12]. Thus, we do not assume that the decision rules of the two
sensors are the same for the simulations in this section. As mentioned earlier, approaches
based on Person-By-Person-Optimization (PBPO) such as Gauss-Seidel scheme have been
used to find the optimal rules in decentralized detection problems [8,14]. These approaches
can guarantee convergence to locally optimal solutions. In this section, we derive some
properties of the minimum Pe and present some numerical results based on enumeration for
both threshold rules and general rules at the sensors. Global optima of the Bayesian problem
can be found using this enumeration algorithm.
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Figure 2.4: Joint densities of Y1 and Y2 given H0 and H1.
2.4.1 Using threshold rules at the sensors
At each sensor, the marginal density of the observation is Gaussian with variance σ2 = 1 and
mean −1 underH0 and mean 1 underH1. The (marginal) likelihood ratios are monotonically
increasing in y1 and y2, respectively; thus, a threshold rule for the likelihood ratios becomes
a threshold rule for y1 and y2.
γj(yj) =
 1 if yj ≥ yτj = σ2 ln τj/20 otherwise. (2.42)
The conditional joint densities of sensor messages are given by (2.11), where
N = 2, R
(1)
0 = (−∞, yτ1) , R
(1)
1 = [yτ1 ,∞) ,
R
(2)
0 = (−∞, yτ2) , R
(2)
1 = [yτ2 ,∞) . (2.43)
As
∫ 5
−5
∫ 5
−5
fi(y1, y2)dy1dy2 ≈ 0.9999 for i = 0, 1, it suffices to let yτj vary within [−5, 5]. We
then use equally spaced values of yτj as threshold candidates. The simulation results for
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threshold rules with different values of π0 are given in Table 2.1. The minimum values of Pe
using threshold rules with π0 = 0.3 are plotted in Figure 2.5.
Table 2.1: Minimum probabilities of error for general decision rules and threshold rules
(based on likelihood ratio). The value ǫt: Spacing; General: Minimum probabilities of error
for general rules; LRT: Minimum probabilities of error for threshold rules.
ǫt π0 General LRT (yτ1 , yτ2) for threshold rules
2 0.1 0.0697 0.0697 (−1,−1)
1 0.1 0.0664 0.0664 (0,−1) & (−1, 0)
0.1 0.1 0.0636 (−0.6,−0.6)
2 0.3 0.1337 0.1337 (−1,−1)
1 0.3 0.1242 0.1242 (0, 0)
0.1 0.3 0.1242 (0, 0)
2 0.5 0.1962 0.1962 (−3,−3)
1 0.5 0.1511 0.1511 (0,−1) & (−1, 0)
0.1 0.5 0.1422 (−0.4,−0.3) & (−0.3,−0.4)
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Figure 2.5: Minimum probabilities of error versus yτ1 and yτ2 with π0 = 0.3.
From the simulation results, it can be observed that
Pe ≤ min {π0, π1} , (2.44)
lim
yτ1 ,yτ2→±∞
Pe = min {π0, π1} . (2.45)
We state below a generalization of these observations.
Proposition 2.6. Consider a parallel structure as in Figure 2.2 with the number of sensors
N = 2, the number of messages D = 2, and the number of hypotheses M = 2. Let f0(y1, y2)
and f1(y1, y2) be the joint probability density functions of the sensor observations given H0
and H1, respectively, where fi(y1, y2), i = 0, 1, are continuous on R
2 and nonzero for −∞ <
y1, y2 < ∞. Assume further that the decision regions of each sensor are of the form R
(j)
0 =
(−∞, yτj) and R
(j)
1 = [yτj ,+∞), yτj ∈ (−∞,+∞), where j = 0, 1 (which are threshold rules
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on the observation values). Then we have (2.44) and (2.45) where Pe is given in (2.10).
Proof. To prove (2.44), let us consider the first sum in (2.10). The summation is carried out
over the values of (d1, d2) such that
P1(d1,d2)
P0(d1,d2)
≥ π0
π1
, or P0(d1, d2) ≤
π1
π0
P1(d1, d2). Thus, from
(2.19), we have:
Pe ≤ π1
∑
(d1,d2):
P1(d1,d2)
P0(d1,d2)
≥
pi0
pi1
P1(d1, d2) + π1
∑
(d1,d2):
P1(d1,d2)
P0(d1,d2)
<
pi0
pi1
P1(d1, d2) = π1. (2.46)
Similarly, by upper bounding the second summation in (2.10), we have Pe ≤ π0. Thus we
finally have (2.44). This result can also be proved using the following arguments. If the
fusion center always picks 0, the resulting Pe will be π1. If the fusion center always picks
1, Pe = π0. The minimum Pe has to be no greater than either of these two probabilities of
error.
Consider the case yτ1 , yτ2 → +∞. Using (2.43), we have that Pi(0, 0)→ 1 for i = 0, 1, and
P1(0,0)
P0(0,0)
→ 1. Also, Pi(d1, d2)→ 0 for (d1, d2) 6= (0, 0). If π0 ≤ π1, P0(0, 0) will be in the first
sum and P1(0, 0) will not be in the second sum of (2.10) (in which case the fusion center
will pick H1 for (d1, d2) = (0, 0)). Thus, when π0 ≤ π1, Pe → π0. Otherwise, if π0 > π1,
P0(0, 0) will not show up in the first sum but P1(0, 0) will be in the second sum (in which
case the fusion center will pick H0 for (d1, d2) = (0, 0)) and Pe → π1. Hence, for general
priors, we have that Pe → min {π0, π1}. The proof for three other cases where yτi → ±∞
can be obtained similarly. Therefore, (2.45) is proved.
Remark 2.1. These results can be extended to a general number of sensors, N ≥ 2.
2.4.2 Using general rules at the sensors
The observation space of each sensor (Yj) is partitioned into two decision regions, R
(j)
0 and
R
(j)
1 . Particularly, we first divide Yj into Ij intervals. Then there will be 2
Ij different ways to
partition these intervals into R
(j)
0 and R
(j)
1 . To go through all of these possibilities, we use an
Ij-bit counter where the n
th bit, n = 0, . . . , Ij − 1, indicates which region the corresponding
interval resides in. The conditional joint densities of sensor messages are given by (2.11),
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where N = 2. The simulation results for general rules with different values of π0 are also
given in Table 2.1. In these simulations, the general rule leads to the same optimal solutions
as the threshold rule. The minimum values of Pe using general rules with π0 = 0.3 are
plotted in Figure 2.6.
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Figure 2.6: Minimum probabilities of error for general rules with π0 = 0.3.
2.5 The majority vote versus the likelihood ratio test
In the rest of this chapter, we consider the discrete case where the distributions of the
observations are given as probability mass functions. We propose a search algorithm for
the optimal solution in a parallel configuration and apply this algorithm to the KDD’99
intrusion detection dataset. In this section, we first show that if the observations of the
sensors are conditionally independent, given the set of thresholds at the local sensors, any
sensor switching from decision 0 to decision 1 will increase the likelihood ratio at the fusion
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center. Furthermore, if the observations are conditionally i.i.d. and the sensors all use the
same threshold for the likelihood ratio test, the likelihood ratio test at the fusion center
becomes equivalent to a majority vote. In the general case, where the observations are not
i.i.d., this property no longer holds; we provide toward the end of the section an example
where the likelihood ratio test and the majority vote yield different results.
Recall that the fusion rule at the fusion center is given by (2.12). If the observations of
the sensors are conditionally independent, the likelihood ratio at the fusion center becomes
P1(l1, l2, . . . , lN )
P0(l1, l2, . . . , lN )
=
∏N
n=1 P1(ln)∏N
n=1 P0(ln)
=
N∏
n=1
P1(ln)
P0(ln)
.
Let us denote by N the set of all local sensors (represented by their indices). We divide N
into two partitions: N0, the set of local sensors that send 0 to the fusion center, and N1,
the set of local sensors that send 1 to the fusion center. Then we have N0
⋃
N1 = N and
N0
⋂
N1 = ∅. Note that, given the conditional joint probabilities of the observations, N0
and N1 are set-valued functions of the thresholds {τ1, τ2, . . . , τN}. Let N0 and N1 denote the
cardinalities of N0 and N1, respectively. Obviously, N0, N1 ∈ Z (where Z is the set of all
integers), 0 ≤ N0, N1 ≤ N , and N0 +N1 = N . Now the likelihood ratio can be written as
P1(l1, l2, . . . , lN )
P0(l1, l2, . . . , lN )
=
∏
n∈N0
P1(ln = 0)
P0(ln = 0)
∏
m∈N1
P1(lm = 1)
P0(lm = 1)
. (2.47)
From the definitions of the decision regions in (2.15), (2.16) we have that
P1(ln = 1) =
∑
Yn:LYn≥τn
P1(Yn) and P0(ln = 1) =
∑
Yn:LYn≥τn
P0(Yn).
Consider the region where Sensor n decides 1 (defined in (2.15)), {Rn1 : Yn ∈ Yn : LYn =
P1(Yn)/P0(Yn) ≥ τn}. We have that
P1(ln = 1) =
∑
Yn:LYn≥τn
P1(Yn) ≥ τn
∑
Yn:LYn≥τn
P0(Yn) ≥ τnP0(ln = 1),
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or
P1(ln = 1)
P0(ln = 1)
≥ τn. (2.48)
Similarly, summing over the region where Sensor n decides 0 (defined in (2.16)), {Rn0 : Yn ∈
Yn : LYn = P1(Yn)/P0(Yn) < τn} , we have that
P1(ln = 0)
P0(ln = 0)
< τn. (2.49)
From (2.47), (2.48) and (2.49), we can see that any sensor switching from decision 0 to
decision 1 will increase the likelihood ratio at the fusion center.
Now, if the observations are conditionally i.i.d. and all the sensors use the same threshold,
then
Pi(ln = 1) =
∑
Yn:LYn≥τ
Pi(Yn) = Pi(lm = 1),
where i = 0, 1; 0 ≤ m,n ≤ N. Thus we can write (2.47) as follows:
P1(l1, l2, . . . , lN)
P0(l1, l2, . . . , lN)
=
(
P1(l = 0)
P0(l = 0)
)N−N1 (P1(l = 1)
P0(l = 1)
)N1
. (2.50)
The fusion rule compares the likelihood ratio in (2.50) with the ratio π0/π1. Again, using
(2.48) and (2.49), it can be seen that the likelihood ratio is a non-decreasing function of N1.
Therefore the likelihood ratio test becomes equivalent to a majority vote rule in this case.
In what follows, we give an example where L(001) > L(110) for the case of three sen-
sors. The observations are supposed to be conditionally independent but not conditionally
identically distributed. If we use the majority vote, the fusion center will output H1 if it
receives (1, 1, 0) and H0 if it receives (0, 0, 1). On the contrary, we will show that, if the
likelihood ratio test is used, the fusion center will pick (0, 0, 1) against (1, 1, 0) for H1. Using
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the independence assumption, we have that
L(110) =
P1(110)
P0(110)
=
P1(l1 = 1)
P0(l1 = 1)
P1(l2 = 1)
P0(l2 = 1)
P1(l3 = 0)
P0(l3 = 0)
,
L(001) =
P1(001)
P0(001)
=
P1(l1 = 0)
P0(l1 = 0)
P1(l2 = 0)
P0(l2 = 0)
P1(l3 = 1)
P0(l3 = 1)
.
Consider the ratio
L(001)
L(110)
=
P1(l1 = 0)P0(l1 = 1)
P1(l1 = 1)P0(l1 = 0)
P1(l2 = 0)P0(l2 = 1)
P1(l2 = 1)P0(l2 = 0)
P1(l3 = 1)P0(l3 = 0)
P1(l3 = 0)P0(l3 = 1)
=
[1− P1(l1 = 1)][1− P0(l1 = 0)]
P1(l1 = 1)P0(l1 = 0)
[1− P1(l2 = 1)][1− P0(l2 = 0)]
P1(l2 = 1)P0(l2 = 0)
P1(l3 = 1)P0(l3 = 0)
[1− P1(l3 = 1)][1− P0(l3 = 0)]
. (2.51)
As l1, l2, and l3 are conditionally independent given each hypothesis, we can choose their
conditional probabilities such that the ratio in (2.51) is larger than 1. For example, we can
choose the conditional probabilities as follows:
P1(l1 = 1) = P0(l1 = 0) = P1(l2 = 1) = P0(l2 = 0) = 0.6,
P1(l3 = 1) = P0(l3 = 0) = 0.9.
Such conditional probabilities can be obtained if we choose P0 and P1 as in Figure 2.7
with k = 2.5 for Sensor 1 and Sensor 2, and k = 10 for Sensor 3; and the thresholds for all
three quantizers satisfy 1/(k − 1) < τ < k − 1.
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Figure 2.7: The majority vote versus the likelihood ratio test: If P0 and P1 of each sensor
is as shown, the thresholds for all three quantizers satisfy 1/(k − 1) < τ < k − 1 with
k = 2.5 for Sensor 1 and Sensor 2 and k = 10 for Sensor 3, then L(001) > L(110). A
majority vote will output H1 if it receives (1, 1, 0) and H0 if it receives (0, 0, 1), while the
likelihood ratio test favors (0, 0, 1) for H1.
2.6 An algorithm to compute the optimal thresholds
As mentioned earlier, the binary decentralized detection problem with two sensors, binary
messages, and the fusion rule fixed a priori is NP-complete [13]. We thus propose in this
section a brute-force search algorithm to solve the optimization problem. (For a discussion
of the complexity of this kind of algorithm, see [12, 13].) This algorithm is suitable for
small sensor networks. Suppose we are given a training dataset, each record of which has
been labeled with either “Normal” or “Attack,” and suppose each record consists of N
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parameters, each of which takes values in a finite set. We do not assume that the observations
of the sensors (the parameters) are conditionally independent or identically distributed.
The a priori probabilities and conditional joint pmf s given each hypothesis then can be
learned from the training dataset. Algorithm 1 is used to search for the optimal thresholds.
Additionally, Algorithm 2 uses the optimal thresholds to detect attacks and Algorithm 3
computes the probabilities of error.
2.7 KDD Cup 1999 data and simulation results
In this section, we first introduce the KDD Cup 1999 data and discuss the application of
decentralized detection to these data. We then present the results of the simulation of the
algorithm proposed in the previous section using the KDD data.
2.7.1 KDD Cup 1999 data
As mentioned earlier, KDD Cup 1999 [17] is a dataset extracted from the TCP dump data
of a LAN. The network was set up to simulate a U.S. Air Force LAN and was speckled with
different types of attacks. Each connection (record) consists of 41 parameters and is labeled
with either “Normal” or some type of attack. Table 2.2 describes some parameters of a TCP
connection.
35
1: Given hypotheses H0 (“Normal”) and H1 (“Attack”) and N parameters {1, 2, . . . , N}.
2: for j = 1 to N do
3: Group all possible values of parameter j into bj equally spaced bins. {In general, bj’s
do not have to be equal.}
4: end for
5: for i = 0 to 1 do
6: Compute the a priori probability πi of hypothesis Hi.
7: Compute the conditional joint pmf s Pi(d1, . . . , dn) and the conditional marginal
pmf s Pi(dj) of the parameters for hypothesis i.
8: end for
9: for j = 1 to N do
10: Compute the likelihood ratios for parameter j: τ 1n, τ
2
n, . . . , τ
bn
n .
{0 ≤ τ 1n ≤ τ
2
n . . . ≤ τ
bn
n ≤ ∞.}
11: end for
12: for j = 1 to N do
13: Remove threshold duplications in the likelihood ratios computed from Step 10 to
have the candidates for the local likelihood ratio test of parameter j:
τ 0j = 0 < τ
1
j < τ
2
j . . . < τ
b′j
j < τ
b′j+1
j =∞. (2.52)
{τ 1j , τ
2
j , . . . , τ
b′j
j are the b
′
j values of likelihood ratio of parameter j (b
′
j ≤ bj).}
14: end for
15: for j1 = 0 to b
′
1 + 1 do
16: for . . . do
17: for jn = 0 to b
′
n + 1 do
18: For each combination {τ j11 , τ
j2
2 , . . . , τ
jn
n }, determine the fusion rule (γ0) based on
the likelihood ratio test at the fusion center given in (2.9).
19: For each combination {τ j11 , τ
j2
2 , . . . , τ
jn
n }, evaluate the average probability of
error Pe using (2.10) and (2.14).
20: end for
21: end for. . .
22: end for
23: Choose a combination that minimizes Pe.
Algorithm 1: An algorithm to compute the optimal thresholds at the sensors (also presented
in [4, 7]).
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1: Given R records of connection.
2: for r = 1 to R do
3: Each local sensor quantizes the corresponding parameter into a single bit of
information (indicating whether there is an attack or not).
4: The fusion center collects all the bits from the local sensors and computes the
likelihood ratio using (2.14) (the joint conditional pmf s are drawn from the training
data).
5: The fusion center makes the final decision using (2.9).
6: end for
Algorithm 2: Using the optimal thresholds for attack detection (also presented in [4, 7]).
1: Given R records of connection.
2: Compute the actual a priori probabilities (π0 and π1), the false alarm probability
(PF = P0(γ0(.) = 1) and the misdetection probability (PM = P1(γ0(.) = 0).
3: Compute the average probability of error using the equation
Pe = π0 × PF + π1 × PM . (2.53)
Algorithm 3: Computing the probabilities of error (also presented in [4, 7]).
Table 2.2: Basic features of individual TCP connections [17].
Feature name Description Type
duration length (number of seconds) of the connection continuous
protocol type type of the protocol, e.g. tcp, udp, etc. discrete
service network service on the destination, e.g., http, telnet, etc. discrete
src bytes number of data bytes from source to destination continuous
dst bytes number of data bytes from destination to source continuous
flag normal or error status of the connection discrete
land 1 if connection is from/to the same host/port; 0 otherwise discrete
wrong fragment number of “wrong” fragments continuous
urgent number of urgent packets continuous
To apply hypothesis testing for network intrusion systems, we can consider the state
“Normal” as hypothesis H0 and a particular type of attack as hypothesis H1. (For a more
general setting, we can group all types of attack into one hypothesis “Attacks” or deal with
“Normal” and all types of attacks separately as a multiple hypothesis testing problem with
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the number of hypotheses, M > 2.) We can use the labeled data to learn the conditional
distributions of the parameters given each hypothesis. These conditional distributions will
then be used to decide the rules for the “sensors” (each of which represents a parameter)
and the fusion center. Here, instead of observing the same event, each sensor looks at an
aspect of the same event.
For example, we extracted all the records labeled with “Normal” and “Smurf” (which
means the connection is a Smurf attack) in the 10% portion of the data given in [17]. We
examined the following parameters of all the normal and Smurf connections:
• duration: Length (in seconds) of the connection (Table 2.2).
• src bytes: Number of data bytes from source to destination (Table 2.2).
• dst bytes: Number of data bytes from destination to source (Table 2.2).
• count: Number of connections to the same host as the current connection in the past
two seconds.
• srv count: Number of connections to the same service as the current connection in
the past two seconds.
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show that the conditional densities of the parameters given either
hypothesis can be very different. Also, some parameters are strongly correlated (for example,
count and srv count given a Smurf attack). Thus, as mentioned earlier, the asymptotic
results for large values of N will not be applicable.
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Figure 2.8: Probability densities of some parameters when the LAN is normal. A base-10
logarithmic scale is used for the Y-axis.
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Figure 2.9: Probability densities of some parameters when there are Smurf attacks. A
base-10 logarithmic scale is used for the Y-axis.
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2.7.2 Simulation results
In these simulations, we employ the algorithm and procedures given in Section 2.6 to detect
Smurf attacks against Normal connections in the KDD data ( [17]).2
We use the 10% portion of the dataset (given in [17]) as the training data. The proportion
of Normal connections is π0 = 0.2573, and the proportion of Smurf connections is π1 =
0.7427. Four parameters (duration, src bytes, dst bytes, and count) are used. The number
of bins for each of the parameters is 8.
The threshold candidates for the four parameters duration, src bytes, dst bytes, and count
are given in Table 2.3. The minimum probability of error computed using the algorithm
is 9.3369E − 4. The results show that this probability of error is obtained at different
combinations of thresholds, one of which, for example, is {1.0082, 1.0003, 1.0004, 1.67}.
Table 2.3: The threshold candidates computed for each parameter. The threshold
duplications in the first three parameters have been removed.
duration 0 1.0082 ∞
src bytes 0 1.0003 ∞
dst bytes 0 1.0004 ∞
count 0 2.81E-4 3.88E-2 9.60E-2 2.04E-1 2.65E-1 1.67 2.21E2 1.37E4 ∞
The detection procedures are then applied to the whole KDD dataset, which is divided
into 10 files for ease of handling. Table 2.4 provides the simulation results. The probabilities
of misdetection, probabilities of false alarm, and the average probabilities of error are plotted
in Figures 2.10 and 2.11.
2A Smurf attack can be detected using rule-based detection [20]; however, here we just use the dataset
as a demonstrative example to illustrate our approach.
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Table 2.4: Probabilities of error for 10 portions (files) of the KDD dataset. We only
consider Normal and Smurf connections. No Normal : Number of Normal connections in
the file; No Smurf: Number of Smurf connections in the file. We use n/a (not available)
for the entries of Pf corresponding to the files with no Normal connections.
File No Normal No Smurf π0 π1 Pm Pf Pe
1 379669 105556 0.7825 0.2175 0.0061 1.1326E-4 0.0014
2 182718 86493 0.6787 0.3213 0.0028 5.4729E-6 9.1007E-4
3 149880 117038 0.5615 0.4385 0.0035 8.0064E-5 0.0016
4 0 489843 0 1 0.0013 n/a 0.0013
5 0 489843 0 1 0 n/a 0
6 0 489843 0 1 0 n/a 0
7 31046 456829 0.0636 0.9364 0 0 0
8 36798 8189 0.8180 0.1820 0.1260 0 0.0229
9 4061 478090 0.0084 0.9916 6.6724E-4 0 6.6162E-4
10 188609 86162 0.6864 0.3136 0.0037 9.7026E-4 0.0018
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Figure 2.10: Misdetection probabilities (left) and false alarm probabilities (right) against
file indices (data from Table 2.4).
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Figure 2.11: Average probabilities of error against file indices (data from Table 2.4).
From the simulation results, we can see that, as expected, the probabilities of error change
from file to file, depending on how close the a priori probabilities and the conditional joint
probabilities of each file are to those of the training data (the simulation of detection using
the training data provides exactly the error probability computed from the algorithm, which
is 9.3369E − 4). Also, it can be noted that the minimum probability of error should also
depend on the number of bins and the manner of binning for each parameter. The overall
results of the simulation are good, which shows that the algorithm performs well with this
dataset.
2.8 Conclusion to the chapter
In this chapter, we have shown that the minimum Bayesian probability of error Pe in a
parallel configuration cannot be expressed as a function of the conditional marginal densities
of the messages from the sensors. We have then characterized this probability of error
based on the set of conditional joint densities. We have shown that there exist optimal
solutions under both Bayesian and Neyman-Pearson formulations, in the general case as well
as in the special case where the sensors are restricted to threshold rules based on likelihood
ratios. We have also provided an enumeration method to search for the optimal thresholds,
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which worked for both the case where sensor observations are given as probability density
functions and the case where they are given as probability mass functions. Simulations have
been carried out for a special case where the joint densities of the sensor observations are
bivariate normal. Within the values of the parameters simulated, the results have shown that
the threshold rules at the sensors achieve the optimal Pe of the general rules. We have then
applied decentralized hypothesis testing to intrusion detection, where each sensor observes a
parameter of the system or current connection. We have derived some relationships between
the majority vote and the likelihood ratio test at the fusion center. Simulations carried out
using the KDD’99 dataset have shown that the algorithm performs well, as expected.
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CHAPTER 3
FICTITIOUS PLAY FOR NETWORK SECURITY
3.1 Introduction
In a two-player noncooperative matrix game, if the payoff matrices are assumed to be known
to both players, each player can compute the set of Nash equilibria of the game and play one
of these strategies to maximize her expected gain (or minimize her expected loss).1 However,
in practice, the players do not necessarily have full knowledge of each other’s payoff function.
If the game is repeated, a mechanism called fictitious play (FP) can be used for each player
to learn her opponent’s motivations. In an FP process, each player observes all the actions
and makes estimates of the mixed strategy of her opponent. At each stage, she updates this
estimate and plays the pure strategy that is the best response (or generated based on the
best response) to the current estimate of the other’s mixed strategy. It can be seen that in an
FP process, if one person plays a fixed strategy (either of the pure or mixed type), the other
person’s strategy will converge to the best response to this fixed strategy. Furthermore, it
has been shown that, for many classes of games, such an FP process will finally render both
players playing the Nash equilibrium.
In this chapter, we examine a two-player game, where Player P1 and Player P2 participate
in a discrete-time repeated nonzero-sum matrix game. In a general setting, P1 hasm possible
actions and P2 has n possible actions to choose from. When such a security game is played
between two automated systems over a network, in order to have a good model, we have
to take into account several practical issues. First, the players may make random decision
errors from time to time. Instead of playing an action aji that is the output of the best-
1The problem of each player choosing a particular Nash equilibrium out of multiple Nash equilibria is a
separate issue not discussed in this thesis.
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response computation, Player Pi may play another action a
k
i with some probability (which
is typically small for functional systems). Second, the observation that each player makes on
her opponent’s actions may also be incorrect, which will definitely affect her own responding
actions. There are many factors giving rise to these problems: the non-ideality of electronic
and software systems, the uncertain and noisy characteristics of observation data, and the
erroneous nature of the channels on which commands and observations are communicated,
to name a few.
As an example, we examine the distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS attack) and a
countermeasure known as the pushback mechanism [21–24]. DDoS is launched from multiple
hosts on the Internet to inundate a targeted system, thus making it less accessible to the
legitimate users. The hosts launching DDoS attacks are known as zombies, which could be
regular hosts that have been compromised by an attacker. As described in [21,22], pushback
allows routers in a network to cooperate in aggregate-based congestion control (ACC). An
aggregate is defined to be a collection of packets that share a common property or parameter.
The properties or parameters used to identify an aggregate are called attack signatures.
In pushback, a router can request upstream routers to rate-limit certain aggregates. The
purpose is two-fold. First, the system can save the bandwidth that would otherwise be
wasted if packets in these aggregates were dropped downstream. Second, if the DDoS attack
traffic comes from a few upstream links, pushback helps protect poor traffic from congestion
due to attack traffic.
When the attacker launches DDoS attacks, it has at its disposal a number of strategies
to choose from. Among these are the set of zombies, the set of targeted computers, and the
attack protocols and traffic patterns. Similarly, the system can also change the pushback
parameters such as the congestion checking time, the target drop rate, and the aggregate
pattern. For each pair of strategies of the attacker and the system, the payoffs for each of
them can be formulated based on the bandwidth occupied by the attacker, the bandwidth
used by the legitimate users, and the costs of attacking and defending. It can thus be seen
that there is a game situation between the attacker and the system, where each player tries
to maximize its own payoff against all the possible strategies of the opponent.
As we can see, on the Internet, the attacker has to communicate with the zombies to
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coordinate the attacks. The master router also controls all the routers in the pushback
mechanism using pushback control messages. Players are subject to both decision errors
(e.g., control messages may get corrupted, delayed, or lost) and observation errors (due to
incomplete information on the other’s actions).
It is these scenarios that we aim to address in this chapter. We examine the convergence of
players’ strategies in the FP process with decision and observation errors. If these strategies
do converge, we quantify the new Nash equilibrium and thus estimate how these decision
and observation errors affect the learning process and the equilibrium of the game.
Relevant literature on fictitious play can be found in [25–31]. A comprehensive treatment
of fictitious play can be found in [32]. For two-player zero-sum classical FP, the convergence
proof was obtained for arbitrary numbers of actions for each player (m × n) [25]. For
nonzero-sum games, the proofs for two-player FP have been found for the case where one
player is restricted to two actions (see [27] for classical FP and [28] for stochastic FP). We
first proposed the use of classical and stochastic FP for network intrusion detection in [33].
We established convergence property of some 2× 2 FP processes with imperfect information
in [34]. We extended these results to the stochastic FP with decision errors and observations
errors in [35]. In [36], we examined a version of stochastic FP with time-invariant frequency
updates.
In Section 3.2, we introduce some background and notation adopted from [28, 29]. The
analysis and simulation results for classical FP with decision and observation errors are
presented in Section 3.3. We address stochastic FP with decision and observation errors
in Sections 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6. We then examine the limit of Nash equilibrium strategies
of stochastic fictitious play in Section 3.7. Some results for stochastic fictitious play with
time-invariant frequency update are given in Section 3.8. In Section 3.9, we apply classical
fictitious play to the pushback mechanism against DDoS attacks. Finally, some concluding
remarks will end the chapter.
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3.2 Static games and fictitious play
3.2.1 Static games
We present a brief introduction to static security games, where Player P1 has m and Player
P2 has n possible actions. In equations written for the generic player Pi, i = 1, 2, we use d
to denote m or n. Denote by p1 ∈ ∆(m) and p2 ∈ ∆(n) a pair of mixed strategies for P1
and P2, respectively, where ∆(d) is the simplex in R
d, i.e.,
∆(d) ≡
{
s ∈ Rd|sj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , d,
d∑
j=1
sj = 1
}
. (3.1)
The utility function of Pi, Ui(pi, p−i), is given by
2
Ui(pi, p−i) = p
T
i Mip−i + τiH(pi), (3.2)
where Mi is the payoff matrix of Pi, i = 1, 2, and H : Interior(∆(d)) → R is the entropy
function of the probability vector pi: H(pi) = −p
T
i log(pi) (note that M1 is of dimension
m × n and M2 n × m). The weighted entropy τiH(pi) with τi ≥ 0 is introduced to boost
mixed strategies. In a security game, τi represents how much Player Pi wants to randomize
its actions, and thus is not necessarily known to the other player. Also, for τ1 = τ2 = 0
(referred to as classical FP), the best response mapping can be set-valued, while it has a
unique value when τi > 0 (referred to as stochastic FP) [29, 37]. For a static game, each
player selects an integer action ai according to the mixed strategy pi. The (instant) payoff
for Player Pi is v
T
ai
Miva−i + τiH(pi), where we use vj, j = 1, . . . , d, to indicate the jth vertex
of the simplex ∆(d) (for example, when d = 2, v1 = [1 0]
T for the first action, and v2 = [0 1]
T
for the second action). For a pair of mixed strategies (p1, p2), the utility functions are given
by the expected payoffs:
Ui(pi, p−i) = E
[
vTaiMiva−i
]
+ τiH(pi). (3.3)
2As standard in the game theory literature, the index −i is used to indicate those of other players, or the
opponent’s in this case.
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Now, the best response mappings β1 : ∆(n)→ ∆(m) and β2 : ∆(m)→ ∆(n) are defined as
βi(p−i) = arg max
pi∈∆(d)
Ui(pi, p−i). (3.4)
If τi > 0, from (3.4), the best response is unique as mentioned earlier, and is given by the
soft-max function:
βi(p−i) = σ
(
Mip−i
τi
)
, (3.5)
where the soft-max function σ : Rd → Interior(∆(d)) is defined as
(σ(x))j =
exj∑d
j=1 e
xj
, j = 1, . . . , d. (3.6)
Note that (σ(x))j > 0, and thus the range of the soft-max function is just the interior of the
simplex.
Finally, a (mixed strategy) Nash equilibrium is defined to be a pair (p∗1, p
∗
2) ∈ ∆(m)×∆(n)
such that for all p1 ∈ ∆(m) and p2 ∈ ∆(n)
Ui(pi, p
∗
−i) ≤ Ui(p
∗
i , p
∗
−i), i = 1, 2. (3.7)
We can also write a Nash equilibrium (p∗1, p
∗
2) as the fixed point of the best response mappings:
p∗i = βi(p
∗
−i), i = 1, 2. (3.8)
3.2.2 Nash equilibrium of the static game
We first prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the static game given in Subsection
3.2.1, then establish the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the 2-player game with some
assumptions in the context of network security.
Proposition 3.1. The static 2-player game in Subsection 3.2.1 where τ1, τ2 > 0 admits a
Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. Consider the mapping β: ∆(m)×∆(n)→ ∆(m)×∆(n), given as
β :
 r1
r2
→
 β1(r2)
β2(r1)
 . (3.9)
Recall that r1, β1(r2) ∈ ∆(m) and r2, β2(r1) ∈ ∆(n). As both mappings β1 and β2 that
constitute β are continuous, β is also a continuous transformation. Furthermore, the set
∆(m)×∆(n), which is the Cartesian product of two compact, convex sets, is itself a compact,
convex set. Using the Brouwer fixed point theorem, there exists at least one fixed point
(r∗1, r
∗
2) such that (r
∗
1, r
∗
2) = β(r
∗
1, r
∗
2), which is a Nash equilibrium of the static game.
We now consider a 2-player 2-action game, where the Attacker can attack or not, and the
Defender can defend or not. Suppose that the payoff matrices of Player P1 and Player P2
are, respectively,
M1 =
 a b
c d
 , M2 =
 e g
f h
 . (3.10)
Assumption 3.1. Based on a realistic security game, we can make the following assump-
tions:
• a < c: When the Defender defends, the payoff of the Attacker will be decreased if it
attacks.
• b > d: When the Defender does not defend, the payoff of the Attacker will be increased
if it attacks.
• e > f : When the Attacker attacks, the payoff of the Defender will be decreased if it
does not defend.
• g < h: When the Attacker does not attack, the payoff of the Defender will be increased
if it does not defend.
We now can state and prove the following uniqueness result.
Proposition 3.2. The static 2-player 2-action game in Subsection 3.2.1 with Assumption
3.1 and τ1, τ2 > 0 admits a unique Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. In what follows, let r1 ≡ (r
1
1, r
2
1)
T , r2 ≡ (r
1
2, r
2
2)
T , β1(r2) ≡ (β
1
1(r2), β
2
1(r2))
T , and
β2(r2) ≡ (β
1
2(r2), β
2
2(r2))
T . Here we write β11(r
1
2) as a scalar-valued function of the only
independent variable r12 using the fact that r2 ∈ ∆(2) (so r
1
2 + r
2
2 = 1). Function β
1
2(r
1
1) is
defined similarly. Also, as r1, r2 ∈ ∆(2), a pair (r
1
1, r
1
2) completely specifies the estimated
frequencies of the players. We have that
r11 = β
1
1(r
1
2) =
(
σ
(
M1r2
τ1
))
1
=
e
{
1
τ1
[ar12+b(1−r
1
2)]
}
e
{
1
τ1
[ar12+b(1−r
1
2)]
}
+ e
{
1
τ1
[cr12+d(1−r
1
2)]
} ,
r12 = β
1
2(r
1
1) =
(
σ
(
M2r1
τ2
))
1
=
e
{
1
τ2
[er11+g(1−r
1
1)]
}
e
{
1
τ2
[er11+g(1−r
1
1)]
}
+ e
{
1
τ2
[fr11+h(1−r
1
1)]
} .
Now we examine the derivatives of β11(r
1
2) and β
1
2(r
1
1) with respect to their own independent
variables:
dβ11(r2)
dr12
=
1
τ1
[(a− c) + (d− b)]β11(r2)β
2
1(r2),
dβ12(r1)
dr11
=
1
τ2
[(e− f) + (h− g)]β21(r1)β
2
2(r1).
From Assumption 3.1, (a − c) + (d − b) < 0 and (e − f) + (h − g) > 0. Thus β11(r
1
2) is
strictly decreasing in r12, and β
1
2(r
1
1) is strictly increasing in r
1
1. Now suppose that there
exist two distinct Nash equilibria, (r′1, r
′
2) and (r
′′
1 , r
′′
2). Obviously, r
′
1 6= r
′′
1 , otherwise we
will have r′2 = r
′′
2 , and these two points coincide. Without loss of generality, assume that
r′1 < r
′′
1 . As β
1
2(r
1
1) is strictly increasing in r
1
1, we have that r
′
2 < r
′′
2 . However, β
1
1(r
1
2) is
strictly decreasing in r12, so r
′
1 > r
′′
1 , which is contradictory to the initial assumption. Thus
the Nash equilibrium is unique.
We illustrate in Figure 3.1 the curves β11(r
1
2) and β
1
2(r
1
1) with the values of M1, M2, τ1,
and τ2 as shown. The intersection of these two curves is the Nash equilibrium of the static
game.
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Figure 3.1: Static 2-player 2-action game in 3.2.1 with Assumption 3.1 and τ1, τ2 > 0 - Best
response mappings.
3.2.3 Discrete-time fictitious play
From the static game described in Subsection 3.2.1, we define discrete-time FP as follows.
Suppose that the game is repeated at times k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. The empirical frequency qi(k)
of player Pi, i = 1, 2, is given by
qi(k + 1) =
1
k + 1
k∑
j=0
vai(j) (3.11)
Using induction, we can prove the following recursive relation:
qi(k + 1) =
k
k + 1
qi(k) +
1
k + 1
vai(k). (3.12)
At time k, Player Pi picks the best response to the empirical frequency of the opponent’s
actions:
pi(k) = βi(q−i(k)). (3.13)
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Discrete-time fictitious play was originally used as a scheme to compute Nash equilibria of
matrix games [25–27]. The detailed algorithms will be presented in Subsections 3.3.3 and
3.4.1.
3.2.4 Continuous-time fictitious play
From the equations of discrete-time FP (3.11), (3.12), using stochastic approximation, the
continuous-time version can be stated as (3.14) [28,29]. (Also see [30,32] for the derivation.
We also employ this approximation method in Subsection 3.5.2.)
p˙1(t) = β1(p2(t))− p1(t),
p˙2(t) = β2(p1(t))− p2(t). (3.14)
Although we are mainly concerned with discrete-time FP in this thesis due to its direct
applications to network security, continuous-time FP will still be used from time to time to
derive some convergence properties for the corresponding discrete-time FP processes.
3.3 Classical fictitious play with decision and observation errors
3.3.1 Classical fictitious play with observation errors
We present in this subsection some analytical results for the case where the error probabilities
associated with the sensor systems are known to the players. We consider a discrete-time
fictitious play process where at each time step k, Player Pi computes the empirical frequency
of its opponent’s actions and picks the best response to this empirical frequency, as described
in 3.2.3.
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Figure 3.2: Players observe their opponent’s actions through binary channels with error
probabilities α, γ, ǫ, and µ.
Proposition 3.3. Consider the discrete-time two-player fictitious play with imperfect ob-
servations given in Figure 3.2. Let eα, eγ , eǫ, and eµ be the empirical error frequencies of the
observations corresponding to the error probabilities α, γ, ǫ, and µ. It holds that
lim
k→∞
a.s. eα = α; lim
k→∞
a.s. eγ = γ,
lim
k→∞
a.s. eǫ = ǫ; lim
k→∞
a.s. eµ = µ,
where we use lim a.s. to denote almost sure convergence.
Proof. Given that the binary channels are independent from stage to stage, this proposition
can be proved using the strong law of large numbers.
Proposition 3.4. Consider a discrete-time two-player fictitious play with imperfect obser-
vations given in Figure 3.2. Let pi(k) be the observed frequency and pi(k) be the empirical
frequency of Player Pi at time step k, it holds that
lim
k→∞
a.s. pi(k) = Cipi(k), i = 1, 2, (3.15)
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where Ci, i = 1, 2 are the channel matrices given by
C1 =
 1− α γ
α 1− γ
 , C2 =
 1− ǫ µ
ǫ 1− µ
 . (3.16)
Proof. At stage k, let N1(k) and N2(k) respectively be the numbers of Player P2’s action 1
and action 2 that Player P1 has observed. Also, let N1(k) and N2(k) be the real numbers of
action 1 and action 2 of Player P2. Apparently, N1(k) + N2(k) = N1(k) + N2(k) = k. We
have that  N1(k)
N2(k)
 =
 1− eǫ(k) eµ(k)
eǫ(k) 1− eµ(k)
 N1(k)
N2(k)
 . (3.17)
Dividing both LHS and RHS of (3.17) by k and taking the limit as k → ∞, we get the
part of (3.15) for Player P2. The part for Player P1 can be proved similarly. For notational
simplicity, from now on we will suppress the time step in pi(k) and pi(k).
Now suppose that the play order is P1-P2 and P2 observes P1’s actions (with errors). We
state the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5. If the error probabilities are known to the players, in each stage, the best
response based on the distribution of the information sets is also the best response based on
the empirical frequency.
Proof. In Table 3.1, we have the expected payoffs of P2 for pure strategies D and N , given
the true empirical frequency of P1, (p
1
1, p
2
1). In classical FP, if P2 ignores the error, it just
picks from this table the pure strategy that yields the better payoff (or randomizes over two
pure strategies with probability 0.5 each if they yield the same payoff). We call this the best
response based on the empirical frequency.
Now we look at the P1-P2 extensive form with imperfect observations plotted in Figure
3.3. In this graph, we model the imperfect observations as the Nature play [10]. Here the
information sets [10] are the very observations of the Defender. Table 3.2 shows the payoffs
of P2 given a particular information set. Each entry of this table is the weighted average of
the payoff of P2 given an information set and a pure strategy of this player. As can be seen
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from here, if P2 plays D, its expected payoff will be
U12 = q
1
1
ep11(1− α) + gp
2
1γ
p11(1− α) + p
2
1γ
+ q21
ep11α + gp
2
1(1− γ)
p11α + p
2
1(1− γ)
,
where q11 and q
2
1 are the probabilities of information set I and II, respectively, q
1
1 = p
1
1(1−
α) + p21γ, q
2
1 = p
1
1α + p
2
1(1− γ). We then have
U12 = ep
1
1(1− α) + gp
2
1γ + ep
1
1α + gp
2
1(1− γ) = ep
1
1 + gp
2
1.
Otherwise, if P2 plays N , the expected payoff can be obtained similarly: U
2
2 = fp
1
1 + hp
2
1.
These two expected payoffs (when P2 plays D and N , respectively) are exactly the same as
those in Table 3.1. Thus Proposition 3.5 is proved.
Remark 3.1. Although the result given in this proposition is not surprising, it does pave
the way for us to propose two FP algorithms, which will be presented in the next section,
where the players simply compensate for the effects of the observation errors before playing
the regular FPs.
Table 3.1: Expected payoffs of P2 for pure strategies D and N , given the true empirical
frequency of P1, (p
1
1, p
2
1).
P2\P1 A w.p. p
1
1 and N w.p. p
2
1 (p
1
1 + p
2
1 = 1)
D ep11 + gp
2
1
N fp11 + hp
2
1
Table 3.2: Payoffs of P2 at a given information set.
P2\P1 I(q
1
1) II(q
2
1)
D
ep11(1−α)+gp
2
1γ
p11(1−α)+p
2
1γ
ep11α+gp
2
1(1−γ)
p11α+p
2
1(1−γ)
N
fp11(1−α)+hp
2
1γ
p11(1−α)+p
2
1γ
fp11α+hp
2
1(1−γ)
p11α+p
2
1(1−γ)
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Figure 3.3: P1-P2 extensive form with imperfect observation.
Theorem 3.1. For a classical nonzero-sum 2×2 fictitious play process with imperfect obser-
vations, let Ci, i = 1, 2, be the channel matrices given in (3.16), where 0 ≤ α, γ, ǫ, µ < 0.5.
At time k, let player i, i = 1, 2, carry out the following steps (Algorithm 5):
(i) Update the observed frequency of the opponent p−i using (3.12).
(ii) Compute the estimated frequency using p−i = C
−1
−i p−i, i = 1, 2.
(iii) Pick the optimal pure strategy using Table 3.1. If there are multiple optimal strategies,
randomize over the optimal strategies with equal probabilities.
Then the mixed strategies of the players will converge to the Nash equilibrium of the under-
lying static game as k →∞.
Proof. Proposition 3.3 and the convergence proof for classical non-zero-sum 2× 2 fictitious
play [26] lead to this theorem. Note that with the assumption 0 ≤ α, γ, ǫ, µ < 0.5, C1 and
C2 are always invertible.
Remark 3.2. Theorem 3.1 only states the convergence of the classical version. A conver-
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gence proof for the stochastic discrete-time FP, however, is as yet not available.
3.3.2 Classical fictitious play with decision errors
In this subsection, we consider the situations where players are not totally rational or the
channels carrying commands are error prone. Specifically, P1 makes decision errors with
probabilities αij ’s where αij , i, j = 1 . . . 2, is the probability that P1 intends to play action
i but ends up playing action j, αij ≥ 0,
∑2
j=1 αij = 1, i = 1 . . . 2. Similarly, P2’s decision
error probabilities are given by ǫij , ǫij ≥ 0,
∑2
j=1 ǫij = 1, i = 1 . . . n. This is called the
“trembling hand” problem in the game theory literature (see for example, [10], Subsection
3.5.5). The decision error matrices D1 and D2 are
D1 =
 1− α γ
α 1− γ
 , D2 =
 1− ǫ µ
ǫ 1− µ
 (3.18)
These decision errors are illustrated in Figure 3.4.
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2 (D)
a22 (N) a
2
2 (N)
P1 (Attacker)
P2 (Defender)
Figure 3.4: A 2× 2 game where players make decision errors with probabilities α, γ, ǫ, and
µ.
With the same arguments as in the case of FP with observation errors, we can see that if
each player precompensates for the decision errors (by randomizing her action with D−1i , i =
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1, 2), both players will end up playing their intended strategies. The FP process then will
converge to the Nash equilibrium of the static game. A more detailed treatment can be
found in Section 3.5.
3.3.3 Algorithms
We present in this subsection two algorithms for classical FP. Algorithm 4, derived from
[25,26], is for the perfect observation case. Players also use these algorithms when they have
no estimates of the error probabilities of their sensor systems and thus ignore the errors.
Algorithm 5, developed based on the analysis in Subsection 3.3.1, is used for players who
have estimates of the error probabilities and want to compensate for these.
1: Given payoff matrix Mi, i = 1, 2.
2: for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} do
3: Update the empirical frequency of the opponent using (3.12).
4: Pick the optimal pure strategy using Table 3.1. If there are multiple optimal
strategies, randomize over the optimal strategies with equal probabilities.
5: end for
Algorithm 4: Classical FP with perfect observations.
1: Given payoff matrix Mi, channel matrix Ci given by (3.16), i = 1, 2.
2: for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} do
3: Update the observed frequency of the opponent using (3.12).
4: Compute the estimated frequency using
p−i = C
−1
−i p−i, i = 1, 2.
5: Pick the optimal pure strategy using Table 3.1. If there are multiple optimal
strategies, randomize over the optimal strategies with equal probabilities.
6: end for
Algorithm 5: Classical FP with imperfect observations.
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3.3.4 Simulation results
We present in this subsection some simulation results for the classical discrete-time FP. The
payoff matrices of Player P1 and Player P2 are chosen to be
M1 =
 1 5
3 2
 , M2 =
 4 1
3 5
 , (3.19)
which satisfy Assumptions 3.1. The static game with simultaneous moves does not have a
pure strategy NE. The mixed strategy NE is (0.8, 0.2) and (0.6, 0.4). The error probabilities
of the binary channels are α = 0.1, γ = 0.05, ǫ = 0.2, and µ = 0.15. The number of steps for
the simulations of classical FP is 10, 000. The empirical frequencies of the players in classical
FP are plotted in Figures 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7.
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Figure 3.5: Classical FP with perfect observations.
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CFP with imperfect obs. − Attacker aware of errrors − Emp. freq. of the Attacker
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Figure 3.6: Classical FP with imperfect observations where players are aware of the error
probabilities.
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 120000
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
CFP with imperfect obs. − Attacker unaware of errrors − Emp. freq. of the Attacker
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 120000
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
CFP with imperfect obs. − Defender unaware of errors − Emp. freq. of the Defender
Figure 3.7: Classical FP with imperfect observations where players are unaware of errors.
As can be seen from the graphs of classical FP, when the observations are perfect, the em-
pirical frequencies converge to the mixed strategy NE (Figure 3.5). When the observations
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are erroneous and the players use Algorithm 5 to fix the errors, the empirical frequencies
exhibit larger fluctuations but still converge to the NE (Figure 3.6). Finally, if the observa-
tions are erroneous, but the error probabilities are unknown to the players, and they still use
Algorithm 4, Figure 3.7 shows the deviation of the empirical frequencies from the original
NE.
3.4 Algorithms for stochastic fictitious play
3.4.1 Algorithms
We present in this subsection two algorithms for discrete-time stochastic FP. Algorithm 6,
derived from [28, 29, 34], is used for the case when players’ observations are considered to
be perfect or when they have no estimates of observation errors. Algorithm 7, a generalized
version of the one in [34], is used for players who have estimates of observation errors and
want to compensate for these errors.
1: Given payoff matrix Mi, coefficient τi > 0, i = 1, 2.
2: for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} do
3: Update the empirical frequency of the opponent using (3.12).
4: Compute the best response βi(q−i(k)) using (3.5). (Note that the result is always a
completely mixed strategy.)
5: Generate an action ai(k) using the mixed strategy from step (2),
ai(k) = rand [βi(q−i(k))], where we use rand to denote the randomizer function that
gives ai(k) such that the expectation E [ai(k)] = βi(q−i(k)).
6: end for
Algorithm 6: Stochastic FP with perfect observations.
3.4.2 A convergence result for m = n = 2 with perfect observations
We restate the following theorem from [28,34], for the general case where the coefficients of
the entropy terms for the players (τ1 and τ2) are not necessarily equal (cf. Equation (3.2)).
This theorem in [28] is stated for τ1 = τ2; however, one can always scale the payoff matrices
to arrive at the general case.
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1: Given payoff matrix Mi, coefficient τi > 0, i = 1, 2.
2: for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} do
3: Update the observed frequency of the opponent q−i using (3.12).
4: Compute the estimated frequency
q−i = f−i(q−i).
5: Compute the best response βi(q−i(k)) using (3.5). (Note that the result is always a
completely mixed strategy.)
6: Generate an action ai(k) using the mixed strategy from step (3),
ai(k) = rand[βi(q−i(k))].
7: end for
Algorithm 7: Stochastic FP with imperfect observations.
Theorem 3.2. (A variant of Theorem 3.2 [28] for general τ1, τ2 > 0.) Consider a two-
player two-action fictitious play process with (LTM˜1L)(L
TM˜2L) 6= 0, where M˜i are the
payoff matrices of Pi, i = 1, 2 and L := (1, −1)
T . The solutions of continuous-time FP
(3.14) satisfy
lim
t→∞
(p1(t)− β1(p2(t))) = 0 (3.20)
lim
t→∞
(p2(t)− β2(p1(t))) = 0, (3.21)
where βi(p−i), i = 1, 2, are given in (3.5).
3.5 Stochastic fictitious play with decision errors
In this section, we consider the situations where players are not totally rational or the
channels carrying commands are error prone. Specifically, P1 makes decision errors with
probabilities αij ’s where αij , i, j = 1 . . . m, is the probability that P1 intends to play action
i but ends up playing action j, αij ≥ 0,
∑m
j=1 αij = 1, i = 1 . . . m. Similarly, P2’s decision
error probabilities are given by ǫij, ǫij ≥ 0,
∑m
j=1 ǫij = 1, i = 1 . . . n. Again, this is the
trembling hand problem in the game theory literature. The decision error matrices D1 and
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D2 are
D1 =

α11 α12 . . . α1m
α21 α22 . . . α2m
. . .
αm1 αm2 . . . αmm
 , D2 =

ǫ11 ǫ12 . . . ǫ1n
ǫ21 ǫ22 . . . ǫ2n
. . .
ǫn1 ǫn2 . . . ǫnn
 . (3.22)
When m = n = 2, the decision error matrices can be written as
D1 =
 1− α γ
α 1− γ
 , D2 =
 1− ǫ µ
ǫ 1− µ
 (3.23)
The decision errors of each player in this case are illustrated in Figure 3.4. In what follows,
we state two standard results in digital communications. The proofs are similar to those for
the case m = n = 2 in [34].
Proposition 3.6. Consider the two-player discrete-time fictitious play with decision errors
where the error probabilities are given in Equation (3.22). Let α˜ij , i, j = 1 . . . m, and
ǫ˜ij, i, j = 1 . . . n, be the empirical decision error frequencies of P1 and P2, respectively. If
decision errors are assumed to be independent from stage to stage, it holds that
lim
k→∞
a.s. α˜ij = αij , i, j = 1 . . . m,
lim
k→∞
a.s. ǫ˜ij = ǫij, i, j = 1 . . . n, (3.24)
where we use lim a.s. to denote almost sure convergence.
Proposition 3.7. Consider a two-player discrete-time fictitious play with decision errors
where the error probabilities are given in Equation (3.22). Let qi be the empirical frequency
of Player Pi’s real actions and qi be the frequency of Player Pi’s intended actions (generated
from the best response at each stage). If decision errors are assumed to be independent from
stage to stage, it holds that
lim
k→∞
a.s. qi = Di( lim
k→∞
a.s. qi), i = 1, 2, (3.25)
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where Di are the decision error matrices given in Equation (3.22).
3.5.1 If the players know their own decision error probabilities
We first consider the case where both players have complete information about the decision
error matrices Di, i = 1, 2. If they both also know the payoff matricesMi, i = 1, 2, then each
can compute and play one of the Nash equilibria right from the beginning. The problem
then can be considered as a stochastic version of the trembling hand problem. Specifically,
suppose that each player still wants to randomize its empirical frequency pi (instead of the
frequency of its intended actions, or intended frequency, pi) by including an entropy term in
their utility function; we have that
Ui(pi, p−i) = p
T
i M˜ip−i + τiH(Dipi), i = 1, 2, (3.26)
where pi’s are the intended frequencies, M˜1 = D
T
1M1D2 and M˜2 = D
T
2M2D1 (these are the
payoff matrices resulting from decision errors using the results in Propositions 3.6 and 3.7;
see for example [10] for derivation). Using pi := Dipi, i = 1, 2, the utility functions now can
be written as
Ui(pi, p−i) = p
T
i Mip−i + τiH(pi), i = 1, 2. (3.27)
The game is thus reduced to the one without decision errors and the Nash equilibrium of
the static game is known from Subsection 3.2.1 to satisfy
p∗i = βi(p
∗
−i), i = 1, 2, (3.28)
or equivalently (with the assumption that Di’s are invertible):
p∗i = (Di)
−1βi(D−ip
∗
−i), i = 1, 2. (3.29)
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The best response is now given as
pi = (Di)
−1βi(p−i) = (Di)
−1σ
(
Mip−i
τi
)
. (3.30)
In the corresponding FP process (the “trembling hand stochastic FP”), as each Player Pi can
observe her opponent’s empirical frequency p−i, she does not need to know D−i to compute
the best response. We thus state below a convergence result for the FP process with decision
errors for the case m = n = 2.
Proposition 3.8. Consider a two-player two-action fictitious play process where players
make decision errors with invertible decision error matrices D1 and D2, respectively. Sup-
pose that at each step, each player calculates the best response taking into account its own
decision errors using (3.30). If (LTM1L)(L
TM2L) 6= 0, L := (1, −1)
T , the solutions of the
continuous-time FP process with decision errors will satisfy
lim
t→∞
p1(t) = D
−1
1 σ
(
M1D2 limt→∞ p2(t)
τ1
)
,
lim
t→∞
p2(t) = D
−1
2 σ
(
M2D1 limt→∞ p1(t)
τ2
)
, (3.31)
where σ(.) is the soft-max function defined in (3.6).
Proof. The proof can be obtained using Theorem 3.2 and the fact that pi = Dipi, i =
1, 2.
It thus can be seen that with knowledge of their own decision errors, players can completely
precompensate for these errors and the equilibrium empirical frequencies remain the same
as those of the original game without decision errors.
3.5.2 If the players are unaware of all the decision error probabilities
We consider in this subsection a two-player fictitious play process with decision errors where
the decision error probabilities are not known to both players. Each player employs the
regular stochastic FP algorithm (Algorithm 6). We are interested in whether or not the FP
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process will converge, and when it does, what the equilibrium will be. We first examine the
general case with arbitrary m, n, and then the special case where m = n = 2. We first use
Proposition 3.7 and the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3 [34] to approximate
the discrete-time FP with the continuous-time version. At time step k, as each Player Pi
generates her action vai(k) based on the best response to her opponent’s empirical frequency
q−i, the expectation of vai(k), i = 1, 2, will be given by
E[va1(k)] = D1β1(q2(k)),
E[va2(k)] = D2β2(q1(k)),
whereD1 andD2 account for decision errors. The mean dynamics of the empirical frequencies
then can be written as
q1(k + 1) =
k
k + 1
q1(k) +
1
k + 1
D1β1(q2(k)),
q2(k + 1) =
k
k + 1
q2(k) +
1
k + 1
D2β2(q1(k)). (3.32)
Letting ∆ = 1/k, we can write (3.32) as
qi(k +∆k) =
k
k +∆k
qi(k) +
∆k
k +∆k
Diβi(q−i(k)). (3.33)
Let t = log(k) and pi(t) = qi(e
t); we then have, as ∆→ 0,
qi(k +∆k)→ qi(e
log(k)+∆) = pi(t+∆).
Also, as ∆ → 0, we have k
k+∆k
→ 1−∆ and ∆k
k+∆k
→ ∆. Thus (3.33) can be rearranged to
become
(pi(t+∆)− pi(t))
∆
= Diβi(p−i(t))− pi(t). (3.34)
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Again, letting ∆→ 0, we then have the continuous-time approximation:
p˙1(t) = D1β1(p2(t))− p1(t),
p˙2(t) = D2β2(p1(t))− p2(t). (3.35)
It can be seen that a pair of mixed strategies (p∗1, p
∗
2) that satisfies
p∗1(t) = D1β1(p
∗
2(t)),
p∗2(t) = D2β2(p
∗
1(t)),
will be an equilibrium point of the dynamics (3.35). Linearizing the right hand sides of
Equations (3.35) at an equilibrium point allows us to examine stability of this point. Any
pi(t) can be written as
pi(t) = p
∗
i (t) + δpi(t).
As both p1(t) and p
∗
1(t) evolve in ∆(m), the entries of δp1(t) must sum up to zero. Similarly,
the entries of δp2(t) must sum up to zero. Thus we can write
δp1(t) = Qp˜1(t), δp2(t) = S p˜2(t),
for some matrix Q of dimension m × (m − 1) and matrix S of dimension n × (n − 1) such
that
1 TQ = 0 and QTQ = I,
1 TS = 0 and STS = I.
Here 1 ’s and I’s are respectively all-one vectors and identity matrices of appropriate dimen-
sions. The reduced order Jacobian matrix is given as
JD =
 −I QTD1∇β1(p∗2)S
STD2∇β2(p
∗
1)Q −I
 . (3.36)
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The following proposition is an adaptation of Proposition 4.1 in [31] for the problem
at hand. It provides a necessary condition for the discrete-time FP process with decision
errors to converge almost surely to an equilibrium point. Detailed discussion can be found
in [29,31].
Proposition 3.9. Consider the above two-player FP process with decision errors where the
players are unaware of all the decision error probabilities. Suppose (p∗1, p
∗
2) is an equilibrium
point of system (3.35). If the Jacobian matrix JD has an eigenvalue λ with Re(λ) > 0, then
(p∗1, p
∗
2) is unstable in the continuous-time system and for the discrete-time system
Prob
{
lim
k→∞
qi(k) = p
∗
i
}
= 0, i = 1, 2. (3.37)
When m = n = 2, we have the following result.
Theorem 3.3. Consider a two-player two-action fictitious play process where players make
decision errors with decision error matrices D1 and D2, respectively. Suppose that the play-
ers are unaware of all the decision error probabilities and use the regular stochastic FP
algorithm 6. If Di, i = 1, 2, are invertible and (L
TM1D2L)(L
TM2D1L) 6= 0, the solutions
of continuous-time FP process with decision errors (3.35) will satisfy
lim
t→∞
p1(t) = D1σ
(
M1 limt→∞ p2(t)
τ1
)
,
lim
t→∞
p2(t) = D2σ
(
M2 limt→∞ p1(t)
τ2
)
, (3.38)
where σ(.) is the soft-max function defined in (3.6).
Proof. We start with the continuous-time approximation (3.35):
p˙1(t) = D1β1(p2(t))− p1(t),
p˙2(t) = D2β2(p1(t))− p2(t).
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As Di, i = 1, 2, are invertible, the above equations can also be written as
(D1)
−1p˙1(t) = β1(p2(t))− (D1)
−1p1(t),
(D2)
−1p˙2(t) = β2(p1(t))− (D2)
−1p2(t).
Using pi = (Di)
−1pi, i = 1, 2, we have that
p˙1(t) = β1(D2p2(t))− p1(t),
p˙2(t) = β2(D1p1(t))− p2(t).
Now, using Theorem 3.2 with the assumption (LTM1D2L)(L
TM2D1L) 6= 0, we have that
lim
t→∞
(
p1(t)− σ
(
M1D2p2(t)
τ1
))
= 0,
lim
t→∞
(
p2(t)− σ
(
M2D1p1(t)
τ2
))
= 0,
or equivalently,
lim
t→∞
(
p1(t)−D1σ
(
M1p2(t)
τ1
))
= 0,
lim
t→∞
(
p2(t)−D2σ
(
M2p1(t)
τ2
))
= 0.
Remark 3.3. The result in this theorem can be extended to the case where only one player
is restricted to two actions, and the other has more than two actions. The convergence proof
of the 2× n stochastic FP with no decision errors is given in [28]. Using this result and the
fact that the players’ actions undergo the decision errors given by D1 and D2, we can arrive
at a similar result.
Remark 3.4. The results in this subsection can be extended to address the general case
where each player has estimates of the decision errors and includes them in the best response
computation.
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3.5.3 A numerical example
We present in what follows some simulation results for this section. The payoff matrices of
Player P1 and Player P2 are chosen to be
M1 =
 1 5
3 2
 , M2 =
 4 1
3 5
 . (3.39)
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Figure 3.8: Stochastic FP with perfect observation.
The simulation result for stochastic FP with no decision errors is given in Figure 3.8.
The number of steps for each simulation of stochastic FP is 20, 000. We use τ1 = 0.5 and
τ2 = 0.3 for all the simulations of stochastic FP. As can be seen, the empirical frequencies
of the players approximately converge to (0.79, 0.21) and (0.47, 0.53). These are also the
solutions of the best response mapping equations in (3.8). It can be noticed that the NE of
the stochastic game is slightly more uniform than that of the classical FP in ((0.79, 0.21)
and (0.47, 0.53) versus (0.8, 0.2) and (0.6, 0.4)) (given in Subsection 3.3.4), due to the
entropy terms in the payoff functions.
The decision error probabilities of P1 and P2 are α = 0.1, γ = 0.05, ǫ = 0.2, and µ = 0.15.
The empirical frequencies of the players are plotted in Figure 3.9. The empirical frequencies
converge to (0.78, 0.22) and (0.42, 0.58), which are also the solutions of the system of
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equations (3.31).
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Figure 3.9: Stochastic FP where players make decision errors.
3.6 Stochastic fictitious play with observation errors
In Subsection 3.3.1, we study the effect of observation errors on convergence to the NE in a
2 × 2 classical FP process. We prove that if the players have correct estimates of the error
probabilities of observations, they can reverse the effect of the channel to obtain the NE of
the original static game. In this section, we present a generalized version of these results
for stochastic FP. Consider a two-player fictitious play process with imperfect observations
where the error probabilities are given in Equation (3.40).
C1 =

α11 α12 . . . α1m
α21 α22 . . . α2m
. . .
αm1 αm2 . . . αmm
 , C2 =

ǫ11 ǫ12 . . . ǫ1n
ǫ21 ǫ22 . . . ǫ2n
. . .
ǫn1 ǫn2 . . . ǫnn
 , (3.40)
where αij, i, j = 1 . . .m is the probability that P1’s action i is erroneously observed as action
j, αij ≥ 0,
∑m
j=1 αij = 1, i = 1 . . . m, and ǫij, i, j = 1 . . . n is the probability that P2’s action
i is erroneously observed as action j, ǫij ≥ 0,
∑m
j=1 ǫij = 1, i = 1 . . . n. The observation
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errors in a 2 × 2 game are illustrated in Figure 3.10. Suppose that the players have their
estimates of the error probabilities as follows:
C1 =

α11 α12 . . . α1m
α21 α22 . . . α2m
. . .
αm1 αm2 . . . αmm
 , C2 =

ǫ11 ǫ12 . . . ǫ1n
ǫ21 ǫ22 . . . ǫ2n
. . .
ǫn1 ǫn2 . . . ǫnn
 , (3.41)
where αij ≥ 0,
∑m
j=1 αij = 1, i = 1 . . . m, and ǫij ≥ 0,
∑m
j=1 ǫij = 1, i = 1 . . . n.
α
1− α
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1− γ
ǫ
1− ǫ
µ
1− µ
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1 (A)
a21 (N) a
2
1 (N)
a12 (D) a
1
2 (D)
a22 (N) a
2
2 (N)
P1 (Attacker) P2 (Defender)
Actions
ActionsObservations
Observations
Figure 3.10: Players observe their opponent’s actions through binary channels with error
probabilities α, γ, ǫ, and µ.
We first restate Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 in the context of repeated games with imperfect
observations.
Proposition 3.10. Consider the two-player discrete-time fictitious play with imperfect ob-
servations where error probabilities are given in Equation (3.40). Let α˜ij, i, j = 1 . . . m, and
ǫ˜ij, i, j = 1 . . . n, be the empirical error frequencies of observations on P1’s and P2’s actions,
respectively. If channel errors are assumed to be independent from stage to stage, it holds
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that
lim
k→∞
a.s. α˜ij = αij , i, j = 1 . . . m,
lim
k→∞
a.s. ǫ˜ij = ǫij, i, j = 1 . . . n, (3.42)
where we use lim a.s. to denote almost sure convergence.
Proposition 3.11. Consider the two-player discrete-time fictitious play with imperfect ob-
servations where error probabilities are given in Equation (3.40). Let qi be the observed
frequency and qi be the empirical frequency of Player Pi. If channel errors are assumed to
be independent from stage to stage, it holds that
lim
k→∞
a.s. qi = Ci( lim
k→∞
a.s. qi), i = 1, 2, (3.43)
where Ci are the channel error matrices given in Equation (3.40).
If both players have their estimates of the error probabilities as in Equations (3.41) and
(3.41), they can play the stochastic FP with imperfect observations algorithm (Algorithm
7) with f−i(q−i) = (C i)
−1q−i to compensate for observation errors (using the results in
Propositions 3.10 and 3.11). Again we can use the same procedure as in Subsection 3.5.2 to
approximate the discrete-time FP with the continuous-time version.
q1(k + 1) =
k
k + 1
q1(k) +
1
k + 1
σ
(
M1(C2)
−1C2q2(k)
τ1
)
,
q2(k + 1) =
k
k + 1
q2(k) +
1
k + 1
σ
(
M2(C1)
−1C1q1(k)
τ2
)
.
The continuous-time approximation is given by
p˙1(t) = σ
(
M1(C2)
−1C2p2(t)
τ1
)
− p1(t),
p˙2(t) = σ
(
M2(C1)
−1C1p1(t)
τ2
)
− p2(t). (3.44)
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It can be seen that a pair of mixed strategies (q∗1, q
∗
2) that satisfies
p∗1(t) = σ
(
M1(C2)
−1C2p
∗
2(t)
τ1
)
,
p∗2(t) = σ
(
M2(C1)
−1C1p
∗
1(t)
τ2
)
,
will be an equilibrium point of the dynamics (3.36). Similar to Subsection 3.5.2, we have
the reduced order Jacobian matrix as follows:
JO =
 −I QT∇β˜1(p∗2)S
ST∇β˜2(p
∗
1)Q −I
 , (3.45)
where
β˜1(p2) = σ
(
M1(C2)
−1C2p2
τ1
)
,
β˜2(p1) = σ
(
M2(C1)
−1C1p1
τ2
)
.
The following proposition provides a necessary condition for the discrete-time FP process
with observation errors to converge almost surely to an equilibrium point.
Proposition 3.12. Suppose (p∗1, p
∗
2) is an equilibrium point of system (3.36). If the Jacobian
matrix JO has an eigenvalue λ with Re(λ) > 0, then (p
∗
1, p
∗
2) is unstable in the continuous-
time system and for the discrete-time system
Prob
{
lim
k→∞
qi(k) = p
∗
i
}
= 0, i = 1, 2. (3.46)
When m = n = 2, we have the following result.
Theorem 3.4. Consider a two-player two-action fictitious play process with imperfect ob-
servations where the error probabilities are given in Figure 3.2 and Equation (3.47):
C1 =
 1− α γ
α 1− γ
 , C2 =
 1− ǫ µ
ǫ 1− µ
 . (3.47)
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Suppose that the players have their estimates of the error probabilities as follows:
C1 =
 1− α γ
α 1− γ
 , C2 =
 1− ǫ µ
ǫ 1− µ
 . (3.48)
The players then play the stochastic FP given in 7. If (LTM1(C2)
−1C2L)(L
TM2(C1)
−1C1L) 6=
0, the solutions of continuous-time FP with imperfect observations (3.14) will satisfy
lim
t→∞
p1(t) = σ
(
M1(C2)
−1C2 limt→∞ p2(t)
τ1
)
,
lim
t→∞
p2(t) = σ
(
M2(C1)
−1C1 limt→∞ p1(t)
τ2
)
, (3.49)
where σ(.) is the soft-max function defined in (3.6).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.3, we use Theorem 3.2 with M˜1 = M1(C2)
−1C2
and M˜2 =M2(C1)
−1C1.
Remark 3.5. It can be seen that the distorted observations (due to the channel matrices)
together with the players’ fixes will form a new NE, which in turn changes the payoffs of the
players, which are still computed by (3.2).
Remark 3.6. Again, the result in this theorem can be extended to the case where only one
player is restricted to two actions, and the other has more than two actions. The convergence
proof of the 2×n stochastic FP with no observation errors is given in [28]. Using this result
and the channel matrices Ci, i = 1, 2, and the error estimates C i, i = 1, 2, we can arrive at
a similar result.
Remark 3.7. When C i = Ci = I, i = 1, 2, this result reduces to convergence of stochastic
FP in [28].
Remark 3.8. When C i = I, i = 1, 2, this result reduces to convergence of stochastic FP
with imperfect observations in [34] (Theorem 3).
Remark 3.9. When C i = Ci, i = 1, 2, this result reduces to convergence of stochastic FP
with imperfect observations where players completely reverse the effect of erroneous channels
(a similar result for classical FP was presented in Section 3.3).
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3.6.1 A numerical example
We present in this subsection a simulation result for the FP process with imperfect obser-
vations. We use the same payoff matrices in the simulation in Section 3.5.
M1 =
 1 5
3 2
 , M2 =
 4 1
3 5
 .
We again use τ1 = 0.5 and τ2 = 0.3. The error probabilities of the observation are α =
0.1, γ = 0.05, ǫ = 0.2, and µ = 0.15. The error probability estimates of the P2 are α =
0.12, γ = 0.03, and those of the P1 are ǫ = 0.15, µ = 0.15. The empirical frequencies of the
players are plotted in Figure 3.11. The empirical frequencies converge to (0.78, 0.22) and
(0.51, 0.49), which are also the solutions of the system of equations (3.49).
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Figure 3.11: Stochastic FP with where players have inaccurate estimate of the error
probabilities.
3.7 Limiting Nash equilibrium of stochastic fictitious play
As can be seen from (3.2), the payoff functions of classical fictitious play are the limit of
those of stochastic fictitious play when τ1 and τ2 tend to 0. One therefore would hope that
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the Nash equilibrium strategies of stochastic fictitious play also converge to those of classical
fictitious play. This in fact is not true, as we show below.
As mentioned in Section 3.2, Nash equilibrium strategies of an m× n static game have to
satisfy
p1 = β1(p2) = σ
(
M1p2
τ1
)
,
p2 = β2(p1) = σ
(
M2p1
τ2
)
.
Let p˜2 =M1p2 and p˜1 =M2p1. Using (3.6), we can write
pi1 =
exp (p˜i2/τ1)∑m
j=1 exp
(
p˜j2/τ1
) , i = 1, . . . ,m,
pi2 =
exp (p˜i1/τ2)∑n
j=1 exp
(
p˜j1/τ2
) , i = 1, . . . , n.
Consider the limit
lim
τ1→0+
pi1 = lim
τ1→0+
1∑m
j=1 exp
((
p˜j2 − p˜
i
2
)
/τ1
) , i = 1, . . . ,m.
We have that
lim
τ1→0+
exp
((
p˜j2 − p˜
i
2
)
/τ1
)
=

1 if j = i or
(
j 6= i and p˜j2 = p˜
i
2
)
,
∞ if p˜j2 > p˜
i
2,
0 if p˜j2 < p˜
i
2.
(3.50)
Thus pi1 will be positive and equal to 1/|O2| only for i ∈ O2, where we use |S| to denote the
cardinality of a finite set S, and O2 is given by
O2 =
{
i : p˜i2 ≥ p˜
j
2, j = 1, . . . , n
}
. (3.51)
For i /∈ O2, p
i
1 = 0. Thus what Player P1 does is essentially randomizing (with equal
probabilities) over the set of actions corresponding to the maximal values of p˜i2. It is known
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that, for the classical static game (with τ1 = τ2 = 0), this is one best response to p2, but
not the only one when there are multiple elements in O2, in which case any mix of these
pure strategies is a best response. Similarly, pi2 will be positive and equal to 1/|O1| only for
i ∈ O1, where O1 is given by
O1 =
{
i : p˜i1 ≥ p˜
j
1, j = 1, . . . ,m
}
. (3.52)
For i /∈ O1, p
i
2 = 0. As these hold for all possible M1 and M2, the limiting p1 and p2 are
generally not a pair of Nash equilibrium strategies of the static game with τ1 = τ2 = 0. For
example, the only pair of Nash equilibrium strategies of the classical static game given in
Subsection 3.3.4 is (0.8, 0.2) and (0.6, 0.4).
3.8 Stochastic fictitious play with time-invariant frequency update
In this section, we introduce the concept of stochastic fictitious play with time-invariant
frequency update (TIFU-FP).
3.8.1 Stochastic fictitious play with time-invariant frequency update
In TVFU-FP, players take the maximum likelihood estimate of the mixed strategy of their
opponent (3.11), (3.12). In TIFU-FP, the estimates of the mixed strategies will be calculated
in a time-invariant manner as follows:
ri(1) = vi(0), (3.53)
ri(k + 1) = (1− η)ri(k) + ηvi(k), (3.54)
where η is a constant and 0 < η < 1. For each player, this is basically the exponential
smoothing formula used in time series analysis (see for example [38]). We will prove that
with this formulation, at time k, ri(k) will be a weighted average of all the actions up to
present of Player Pi where more recent actions have higher weights. In TIFU-FP, both
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players employ Algorithm 8.
1: Given payoff matrix Mi, coefficient τi > 0, i = 1, 2.
2: for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} do
3: Update the estimated frequency of the opponent using (3.53), (3.54).
4: Compute the best response using (3.5). (Note that the result is always a completely
mixed strategy.)
5: Randomly play an action vi(k) according to the best response mixed strategy
βi(r−i(k)).
6: end for
Algorithm 8: Fictitious play with time-invariant frequency update.
The mean dynamics of the evolution of TIFU-FP can be written as
ri(k + 1) = (1− η)ri(k) + ηβi(r−i(k)), i = 1, 2. (3.55)
Note that Equations (3.55) are just evolution of the estimated frequencies ; the empirical
frequencies still evolve in a time-varying manner:
qi(k + 1) =
k
k + 1
qi(k) +
1
k + 1
vi(k), i = 1, 2. (3.56)
The mean dynamics of empirical frequencies then can be written as
qi(k + 1) =
k
k + 1
qi(k) +
1
k + 1
βi(r−i(k)), i = 1, 2. (3.57)
3.8.2 Analysis
Estimated Frequencies and Empirical Frequencies
We present here two propositions for TIFU-FP: The first shows the weights of each player’s
actions in the estimated frequency, and the second shows the relationship between estimated
frequencies and empirical frequencies.
Proposition 3.13. For k ≥ 2, the estimated frequencies in TIFU-FP constructed using
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(3.53), (3.54) will satisfy
ri(k) = (1− η)
k−1vi(0) + (1− η)
k−2ηvi(1)
+(1− η)k−3ηvi(2) + . . .+ (1− η)ηvi(k − 2) + ηvi(k − 1), (3.58)
where i = 1, 2.
Proof. This result can be proved using induction.
Proposition 3.14. In TIFU-FP, the empirical frequencies are related to the estimated fre-
quencies calculated using (3.53), (3.54) through the following equation:
qi(k + 1) =
1
k + 1
(
2η − 1
η
ri(1) + ri(2) + . . .+ ri(k) +
ri(k + 1)
η
)
, i = 1, 2.
Proof. This result can be proved by writing the actions of Player Pi at times 0, 1, . . . , k in
terms of the estimated frequencies at times 1, 2, . . . , (k + 1).
Convergence Properties of the Mean Dynamics in TIFU-FP
Theorem 3.5. Consider a TIFU-FP with Assumption 3.1 and τ1, τ2 > 0. The mean dy-
namics given in Equations (3.55) are asymptotically stable if and only if
η <
2
[(c−a)+(b−d)][(e−f)+(h−g)]
τ1τ2
r¯11 r¯
2
1 r¯
2
1 r¯
2
2 + 1
. (3.59)
Proof. As can be seen in Equations (3.55), this is a deterministic nonlinear discrete-time
time-invariant system. We linearize the system at the fixed point and examine stability
properties of the linearized system using techniques described in standard textbooks for
nonlinear systems (e.g., [39]). Using the mean dynamics (3.55), where
r1(k) =
 r11(k)
r21(k)
 , r2(k) =
 r12(k)
r22(k)
 , (3.60)
it can be seen that a pair (r¯1, r¯2) that satisfies r¯i = βi(r¯−i), i = 1, 2, is a fixed point of the
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system. Consider the Jacobian matrix
J =
∂F (r)
∂r
=
 ∂F1(r)∂r11 ∂F1(r)∂r12
∂F2(r)
∂r11
∂F2(r)
∂r12
 .
We have that
∂F1(r)
∂r11
=
∂F2(r)
∂r12
= 1− η,
∂F1(r)
∂r12
= η
dβ11(r2)
dr12
.
Recall that β1(r2) = σ
(
M1r2
τ1
)
, where
M1r2
τ1
=
 1τ1 [ar12 + b(1− r12)]
1
τ1
[cr12 + d(1− r
1
2)]
 .
Thus
β11(r2) =
e
{
1
τ1
[ar12+b(1−r
1
2)]
}
e
{
1
τ1
[ar12+b(1−r
1
2)]
}
+ e
{
1
τ1
[cr12+d(1−r
1
2)]
} .
Then
dβ11(r2)
dr12
=
1
τ1
[(a− c) + (d− b)]β11(r2)β
2
1(r2),
∂F1(r)
∂r12
=
η
τ1
[(a− c) + (d− b)]β11(r2)β
2
1(r2).
At the fixed point (r¯1, r¯2), we can write
∂F1(r¯)
∂r12
=
η
τ1
[(a− c) + (d− b)]r¯11 r¯
2
1.
Similarly,
∂F2(r¯)
∂r11
=
η
τ2
[(e− f) + (h− g)]r¯12 r¯
2
2.
Using the conditions for local stability, |µ1,2| ≤ 1, where µ1,2 are eigenvalues of the Jacobian
matrix, we finally have the condition in Equation (3.59).
81
Remark 3.10. Although this theorem only mentions the asymptotic stability of the estimated
frequencies (of the mean dynamics), once these estimated frequencies converge to the Nash
equilibrium, the best responses will also converge to the Nash equilibrium, and so will the
empirical frequencies in the long run.
3.8.3 Adaptive fictitious play
In this section we examine an adaptive FP algorithm (hereafter referred to as AFP) based
on FP with time-invariant frequency update, where the step size η is piecewise constant and
decreased over time. For the specific implementation shown in Algorithm 9, the step size
is either kept fixed or halved, based on the variance of empirical frequency in the previous
time window.
1: Given payoff matrix Mi, coefficient τi, i = 1, 2, initial step size η0, minimum step size
ηmin, and window size T .
2: for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} do
3: Update the estimated frequency of the opponent, r−i, using (3.53), (3.54).
4: Compute the best response mixed strategy βi(r−i(k)) using (3.5).
5: Randomly play an action ai(k) according to the best response mixed strategy
βi(r−i(k)), such that the expectation E [ai(k)] = βi(r−i(k)).
6: if at the end of a time window, mod (k, T ) = 0, then
7: Compute the standard deviation of the estimated frequencies (stdef) in the time
window [r−i(k − T + 1), . . . , r−i(k)] (using an unbiased estimator):
mef(k) =
1
T
k∑
h=k−T+1
r−i(h)
stdef(k) =
√∑k
h=k−T+1 (r−i(h)−mef(k))
2
(T − 1)
8: if the computed stdef(k) has decreased compared to previous time window then
9: Decrease step size: η = 0.5 η and η = max(η, ηmin).
10: else
11: Keep step size η constant.
12: end if
13: end if
14: end for
Algorithm 9: Adaptive fictitious play.
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3.8.4 Simulation results
We present in this subsection some simulation results for TIFU-FP and AFP where the
payoff matrices and entropy coefficients are chosen to be
M1 =
 1 5
3 2
 , M2 =
 4 1
3 5
 , τ1 = 0.5, τ2 = 0.3.
The Nash Equilibrium of the static game is (0.79, 0.21) and (0.47, 0.53). The local stability
threshold (the RHS of Equation (3.59)) is η0 = 0.2536. For simplicity, in the graphs shown
here, we only plot the first component of each frequency vector.
Fictitious Play with Time-Invariant Frequency Update
Some simulation results for the mean dynamics of TIFU-FP (Equations (3.55)) are given in
Figures 3.12 and 3.13. When η = 0.25 < η0 = 0.2536, the estimated frequencies are shown
in Figure 3.12. The simulation results show that both estimated frequencies and empirical
frequencies (not presented here due to space limitations) converge to the NE as expected.
When η = 0.26 > η0, however, the estimated frequencies do not converge anymore. These
simulations thus confirm the theoretical result in Theorem 3.5. It is also worth noting that
the empirical frequencies in the case η = 0.26 still converge to the NE.
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Figure 3.12: Mean dynamics of FP with time-invariant frequency update – estimated
frequencies, η = 0.25, η0 = 0.2536.
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Figure 3.13: Mean dynamics of FP with time-invariant frequency update – estimated
frequencies, η = 0.26, η0 = 0.2536.
Unlike the mean dynamics, a stochastic TIFU-FP process (generated with Algorithm 8)
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exhibits significant random fluctuations. The graph in Figure 3.14 shows the estimated
frequencies of such a process where we choose η = 0.01. However, the empirical frequencies
(whose graph is not shown here due to space limitations) still converge to the NE .
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Figure 3.14: Stochastic FP with time-invariant frequency update – estimated frequencies,
η = 0.01.
Adaptive Fictitious Play
The simulation result for stochastic FP with time-varying frequency update is given in
Figure 3.15. Some simulation results for adaptive FP are shown in Figures 3.16 and 3.17.
The payoff matrices and entropy coefficients are the same as those in 3.8.4. Initial and
minimum step sizes are chosen to be η0 = 0.1 and ηmin = 0.0005, respectively. The time
window for updating the step size is T = 50 steps. The evolution of the empirical frequencies
is depicted in Figure 3.16, which shows that adaptive FP converges faster than the stochastic
FP with time-varying frequency update (TVFU-FP) (Figure 3.15). We however remark that
it is possible to incorporate a decreasing coefficient into the step size in TVFU-FP (which
is originally 1/k) to make the TVFU-FP process converge faster [31]. The update of the
step size in adaptive FP is shown in Figure 3.17. Note that when compared to the step
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size 1/k in TVFU-FP, the step sizes in adaptive FP are higher in the beginning and smaller
afterwards, resulting in aggressive convergence first and less fluctuation in the stable phase.
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Figure 3.15: Stochastic FP with time-varying frequency update – empirical frequencies.
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Figure 3.16: Adaptive stochastic FP – empirical frequencies.
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Figure 3.17: Adaptive stochastic FP – evolution of step size.
3.9 Using fictitious play in the pushback mechanism against DDoS
attacks
3.9.1 Distributed denial-of-service attacks and the push-back mechanism
A distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS attack) is an attack launched from multiple
computers in a network to flood the resources of a targeted system, thus making it less
accessible to the intended users. The computers launching attacks are called zombies, which
could be regular hosts that have been compromised by the attacker. Many network-based
countermeasures against DDoS have been proposed and simulated; a survey can be found
in [40]. In this work we employ pushback, a mechanism first proposed in [21].
As described in [21, 22], pushback is a mechanism that allows routers in a network to
cooperate in aggregate-based congestion control (ACC). An aggregate is defined to be a
collection of packets that share a common property or parameter, such as ICMP ECHO
packets or packets with the same destination IP address. The properties or parameters used
to identify an aggregate are called attack signatures. Based on aggregates, traffic and packets
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are divided into three different categories: “bad,” “poor,” and “good.” Bad traffic is that
generated by the attackers. Poor traffic is from legitimate users but shares the same attack
signatures. Finally, good traffic does not match the attack signatures but may suffer from
the congestion. In local ACC, an individual router identifies the aggregates that cause the
congestion and tries to cut down the throughput of these aggregates. In pushback, a router
can request adjacent upstream routers to rate-limit some aggregates. This way, the system
can save the bandwidth that would otherwise be wasted if packets in these aggregates were
dropped downstream. Furthermore, if the DDoS attack traffic comes from a few upstream
links, pushback helps protect poor traffic from congestion due to attack traffic.
From now on, we will use Attacker to refer to the DDoS attacker and all the zombies under
its control, and Defender to refer to all the routers taking part in the pushback mechanism.
When the Attacker launches DDoS attacks, it has at its disposal a number of strategies to
choose from. Among these are the set of zombies, the set of targeted computers, and the
attack protocols and traffic patterns. Similarly, the Defender can also change the pushback
parameters such as the congestion checking time, the target drop rate, and the aggregate
pattern. For each pair of strategies of the Attacker and the Defender, the payoffs for each of
them can be formulated based on the bandwidth occupied by Attacker, the bandwidth used
by the legitimate users, and the costs of attacking and defending. It thus can be seen that
there is a game situation between the Attacker and the Defender, where each player tries to
maximize its own payoff against all the possible strategies of the opponent.
In [23], DDoS attacks are modeled as a Bayesian game among the Attacker, the Defender,
and legitimate users. With such a game formulation, in order to compute a Nash equilibrium
pure or mixed strategy, each player has to have full knowledge of other players’s payoff
matrices. The paper also mentions a repeated mechanism where at each step, each player
makes the best response to current strategies of other players. Although this mechanism
allows each player to proceed without necessarily knowing others’s payoff matrices, it works
well only when the game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
In this work, we examine a repeated game model based on the fictitious play (FP) process
for pushback defense. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, in terms of information, there
are two main features that distinguish an FP process from the corresponding static game
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(the static game with the same payoff formulation). First, each player can make decisions
without necessarily knowing the other’s payoff matrix. Second, each player has to be able to
observe the other’s actions. It can be seen that in an FP process, if one person plays a fixed
strategy (either of the pure or mixed type), the other person’s strategy will converge to the
best response to this fixed strategy. Furthermore, it has been shown that, for many classes
of games, such an FP process will finally render both players playing the Nash equilibrium
strategies.
3.9.2 Implementation details
PRIME Network Simulator
In this work we use the PRIME (Parallel Real-time Immersive Modeling Environment)
network simulator/emulator [41–43]. Intended to simulate large-scale computer networks
with thousands to millions of network entities, PRIME has to main components: PRIME
SSF (Scalable Simulation Framework) and PRIME SSFNet. While SSF is the kernel that
supports parallel and real-time simulation, PRIME SSFNet is the upper layer providing
network simulation functions.
Network Topology
The network topology used in the simulation is shown in Figure 3.18. This is a large-scale,
up-to-date network with OC − 3 and OC − 48 links connecting backbone routers. Of the 64
hosts, U1 to U64, there are 8 zombies and 56 legitimate users. Both zombies and users send
packets to servers S1 and S2. The routers Ri.j, i = 0, 1, 2, 3, are organized in a hierarchical
manner where the subscript i denotes the level, and the subscript j denotes the router in
a level. On the Attacker’s side, a central controller controls all the zombies in the network
using control messages. Similarly, in the Defender’s side, a master router controls the (slave)
routers taking part in the pushback mechanism with pushback control messages.
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Figure 3.18: A network topology with OC − 3 and OC − 48 links used for flow-based
simulation.
Each router employs a version of the IP protocol with modifications for enforcing pushback
[21,22]. Every router checks for congestion after each specified time interval, which we refer
to as the congestion checking interval, tc. A router is considered to be in congestion if
wi > (1 + d)wo, (3.61)
where wi is the incoming data rate, d is the target drop rate, and wo is the outgoing bandwidth.
The target drop rate is the acceptable rate of dropping packets for the router. If a router
detects congestion, it looks through the log of dropped packets that it maintains to identify
an attack signature. Since the source IP address of a packet can be spoofed by the Attacker,
we only use the destination IP address as the attack signature. Thus, the router identifies the
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most frequently occurring destination IP address in the dropped packets log as the signature.
For the sake of efficiency, the log is of a fixed size and new log records overwrite older ones
if the log is full. In subsequent checks for congestion, if the router detects that the incoming
traffic not matching the signature is still greater than (1 + d)wo, then each time it adds the
next most frequently occurring destination IP address in the log to the current signature.
Each signature has a timestamp which is updated every time the router detects congestion.
A router also sends the identified signatures to its immediately upstream routers and uses
signatures received from downstream routers as attack signatures. Traffic through the router
which matches the signature (signature traffic, ts) is filtered out. The maximum signature
traffic allowed to pass through the router is wo × (1 + d) − tns, where tns is non-signature
traffic. A router also periodically checks if any of the attack signatures has expired after a
specified time interval (which we refer to as Refresh Interval, tr). Routers periodically send
update messages for signatures to upstream routers. Routers use update messages from
downstream routers to update the timestamp of the signatures received from downstream
routers.
Game Formulation
The Attacker’s pure strategies are given by Aatt = {A1, . . . , A5}, where Ai, i = 1, . . . , 5 are
the collective attack data rates generated by all 8 zombies (Table 3.3).
Table 3.3: Attacker’s actions (data rates generated by all 8 zombies) and collective users’
data rates.
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 Users’ Data rates
13.76 Gbps 5.504 Gbps 2.752 Gbps 0.275 Gbps 30.58 Mbps 124.42 Mbps
The Defender consists of all the routers taking part in pushback defense, {R1, . . . , Rr}.
The pushback behavior of a router is represented by three parameters: tc, tr, and d. The
action space of the Defender, Asys = {S1, . . . , S6}, is specified in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4: Defender’s actions.
Actions tc (s) tr (s) d
S1 2 5 0.05
S2 2 10 0.05
S3 4 5 0.05
S4 2 5 0.03
S5 6 10 0.05
S6 2 5 0.07
For each pair (Ai, Sj), i = 1, . . . , 5, j = 1, . . . , 6, the payoff of the Attacker is given by
Uatt = α
Bao
BN
+ (1− α)
(
1−
∑L
l=1B
(l)
lo∑L
l=1B
(l)
lw
)
, (3.62)
where B
(l)
lo is the bandwidth occupied by the legitimate user l, and B
(l)
lw is the bandwidth
required by the legitimate user l, l = 1, . . . , L, where L is the number of legitimate users
(56 in our simulations), Bao is the bandwidth occupied by the Attacker, and BN is the
bandwidth capacity (BN = 155.52 Mbps in this simulation). The term α ∈ [0, 1] is used to
balance between the damage the Attacker does to the Defender and the damage it causes
to the legitimate users; α is chosen to be 0.2 throughout our simulations. The payoff of the
Defender is given by
Usys = ω
∑L
l=1B
(l)
lo∑L
l=1B
(l)
lw
+ (1− ω)
(
1−
Bao
BN
)
, (3.63)
where ω ∈ [0, 1] is used to balance between the utility the Defender can provide for the
legitimate users and the pushback it applies against the Attacker; ω is chosen to be 0.8
throughout our simulations. The costs of attacking and defending can also be included in
the payoff functions.
For the Attacker, the action to be taken is determined by the controller and sent to
the zombies. The zombies then adjust their data rates and pick their victims accordingly.
Similarly, for the Defender, the action to be taken is determined by the master router and sent
to the slave routers. The slave routers then adjust their pushback parameters accordingly.
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Our simulations consists of two steps: payoff measurement and fictitious play. In the first
step, the Defender and the Attacker are forced to take each pair of actions. The attack
traffic, good traffic, and poor traffic at router R0.0 are then measured. These measurements
are used to calculate the payoffs for the Attacker and the Defender using Equations (3.62)
and (3.63). In the second step, both the Defender and the Attacker use a fixed time interval
as a “time step,” during which the action taken by the opponent is identified. At the end
of each time interval, both players choose the next action to be taken (which is the best
response to the empirical frequencies of the opponent’s actions (using Algorithm 8 with the
payoff matrices obtained from Step 1). The time step is chosen to be 50 s, which allows
enough time for the pushback mechanism to stabilize.
3.9.3 Flow-based simulation versus packet-based simulation
In packet-based simulation, the Attacker’s traffic consists of fixed length IP packets gener-
ated at a constant rate by the zombies. Users’ traffic consists of fixed length IP packets
with exponentially distributed inter-packet times. For determining the parameter of the
exponential distribution, we set the average user data rate to be the bandwidth of the router
R0.0 divided by the number of hosts in the network. The rationale behind this is that if all
users send out data at this rate, there should be no congestion in the network. The data
rates generated by the each zombie range from around 300 to 1 times the legitimate user
data rate.
Packet-based simulations are implemented in PRIME SSFNet for network bandwidths in
the order of 20 Mbps. Simulations for networks with larger bandwidths require significantly
long times. Thus for gigabit networks (Figure 3.18), we adopt the flow-based simulation
approach [44]. In this approach, we generate flows of packets instead of simulating packet
events. We model two different types of traffic: background traffic and Attacker traffic.
Attacker traffic is the traffic generated and controlled by the Attacker. It is deterministic
in nature, i.e., the Attacker can precisely control these flows. Background traffic is the
aggregate of all other traffic in the network and is stochastic in nature. For background
traffic, we assume that different flows are statistically independent.
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3.9.4 Simulation results
In this subsection, we present the results of flow-based simulation. The packet-based simu-
lation results can be found in our paper [24]. The empirical frequencies of the actions of the
Defender and the Attacker are presented in Figures 3.19 and 3.20, respectively. Again, we
use the parameters given in Subsection 3.9.2.
Figure 3.19: Defender’s empirical frequencies.
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Figure 3.20: Attacker’s empirical frequencies.
From Gambit, there are three Nash equilibria:
• Attacker (0, 0, 0, 1, 0), Defender (0, 0.992, 0, 0, 0.008, 0).
• Attacker (0, 0, 0, 1, 0), Defender (0, 0.992, 0.008, 0, 0, 0).
• Attacker (0, 0, 0, 1, 0), Defender (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0).
The fictitious play simulation results are in agreement with the Nash equilibria obtained
from Gambit. Note that the first two mixed-strategy Nash equilibria (MSNE) shown above
are very close to pure strategies. In the case where there are mixed-strategy Nash equilibria,
if the first action (at time τ = 0) of each player is chosen appropriately (which is necessary
only if there are both mixed-strategy NE and pure-strategy NE), the empirical frequencies of
the player’s actions will converge to a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, which means each
player will alternate among the pure strategies constituting the MSNE with proportional
numbers of times.
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3.10 Conclusion to the chapter
In this chapter, we have introduced and discussed some repeated security game models that
take into account players’ decision errors and observation errors. Each player does not have
access to her opponent’s payoff matrix and thus has to learn this through the fictitious play
process. However, in a practical setting, each player is expected to make random decision
errors from time to time and also has to respond to imperfectly observed actions of the other
player. We have studied the convergence properties of such games and, if the FP process
does converge, quantified the new equilibrium. Such analyses will help provide guidelines
for players to maximize their gain or minimize their loss in a nonideal environment.
We normally start from the mean dynamics of the discrete-time version of a game, proceed
to continuous-time approximation and then analyze convergence of this continuous-time
version. Although the convergence of the continuous-time fictitious play does not guarantee
the almost sure convergence of the discrete-time counterpart, it does provide the necessary
limiting results for the discrete-time version.
We have also introduced a time-invariant scheme to estimate the frequency of the op-
ponent’s actions in a two-player two-action fictitious play process. We have proved local
stability of the unique Nash equilibrium for the mean version of this FP dynamics. This
frequency update scheme, when used adaptively, allows players to converge faster to the
Nash equilibrium. For this two-player two-action FP, conditions for global stability, if they
exist, are yet to be found. Also, having more than two possible actions for each player is an
intriguing research extension.
Finally, we have applied fictitious play algorithms to the push-back mechanism against
DDoS attacks. The simulation results using PRIME SSFNet have shown that the empirical
frequencies of the players’ actions converge to the Nash equilibrium strategies of the game.
One necessary assumption in a fictitious play process is that each player is able to observe
the actions of the opponent. As mentioned earlier, the Attacker’s central controller has
to send messages to the zombies to coordinate the attacks. On the Defender’s side, the
master router also controls all the routers in the pushback mechanism using pushback control
messages. In these simulations, we assume that each player has access to its opponent’s
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control messages, and thus can observe the opponent’s actions. In practice, players are
subject to both decision errors (e.g., control messages may get corrupted, delayed, or lost)
and observation errors (due to incomplete information on the other’s actions). As shown
earlier in this chapter, such complications may affect the convergence and the Nash equilibria
of the game.
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CHAPTER 4
STOCHASTIC GAMES FOR SECURITY IN
NETWORKS WITH INTERDEPENDENT NODES
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we examine the security game over a network of multiple nodes whose
security assets and vulnerabilities are correlated. The game is still defined between two
players: an Attacker and a Defender (the intrusion detection system – IDS). The nodes are
generally of different values to each player. Each individual node is also valued differently
by the Attacker and the Defender. The Attacker can launch different types of attacks
such as DoS, port-scanning, and malware toward a particular node. The Defender has to
monitor the network to detect attacks and can also take actions to recover a node such as
patching security breaches. We address the interdependency among nodes in two aspects:
security assets and vulnerabilities. A node’s security asset depends not only on its own well-
being, but also on the states of other nodes in the network. Also, a node tends to be more
vulnerable to attacks if some of its neighbors have been compromised. Taking heterogeneity
and interdependency into account, each player has to figure out what is the best strategy
to employ at each state of the network. Here we attempt to answer this question using the
frameworks of both nonzero-sum and zero-sum stochastic games.
Intrusion detection in heterogenous networks has been examined in [45] as a nonzero-sum
static game. The analysis allows one to compute the Attacker’s and the Defender’s optimal
strategies as probability mass distributions on the nodes to attack and defend. In another
paper [46], the network security problem between N defenders and M attackers is modeled
as an (N +M) nonzero-sum stochastic game. However, these works still assume the security
assets to be independent.
A formulation of the problem that takes into account interdependency of nodes in terms of
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vulnerability can be found in [47]. This work is based on zero-sum stochastic games and still
assumes no correlation among the security assets. Nonzero-sum stochastic games have been
used in [48]. Although there are multiple components in the system under consideration,
the analysis in [48] is not generally applicable to multi-node networks.
In this chapter, we attempt to extend these earlier works to build a more comprehensive
security model. We propose a network model based on linear influence networks [49], which
enable us to take into consideration the interdependency among the nodes in terms of both
security assets and vulnerabilities. We employ the frameworks of both nonzero-sum and
zero-sum stochastic games to solve the problem. The model based on zero-sum games has
been presented in [50].
In Section 4.2, we introduce our model for interdependency of security assets and vul-
nerabilities. In Section 4.3, we use this model to formulate the problem as a nonzero-sum
discounted stochastic game and solve the game using a nonlinear program. We then present
a numerical example for the nonzero-sum game toward the end of this section. We examine
the zero-sum stochastic game with a positive stop probability at each state and a numerical
example in Section 4.4. Finally, some concluding remarks are given in Section 4.5.
4.2 Linear influence network models for security assets and for
vulnerabilities
We present in this section a network model based on the concept of linear influence networks
[49]. We use weighted directed graphs to quantify the influences among the nodes of a
network in terms of security assets and vulnerabilities. The security asset of each node is
different from the standpoints of the Attacker and the Defender.
4.2.1 Linear influence network model for security assets
We use the term security asset for a particular node to quantify how important it is to
each player. A network is modeled using two weighted directed graphs, one for the Attacker
GA = {N , EA}, and one for the Defender GD = {N , ED} where N is the set of nodes, and the
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elements of sets EA and ED represent the influence among the nodes from the standpoints
of the Attacker and the Defender, respectively. We denote by n the cardinality of N . In
what follows, we suppress the subscripts A and D and describe a generic model for security
assets based on linear influence networks. For each edge eij ∈ Es, an associated scalar wij
is defined to quantify the influence of node i on node j, where i, j ∈ N . We then have the
entries of the influence matrix W as follows:
Iij =
 wij if eij ∈ Es0 otherwise, (4.1)
where 0 < wij ≤ 1 ∀i, j ∈ N and
∑n
i=1wij = 1, ∀j ∈ N .
Let s = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} be the vector of independent security assets and x = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}
be the vector of effective security assets. The influence equation relates the independent se-
curity assets to the effective security assets as follows:
x = Is. (4.2)
Note that the edges of the form wjj = 1−
∑n
i=1,i 6=j wij signify the portion of influence of
a node on the independent security asset of itself.
With the condition
∑n
i=1wij = 1, ∀j =∈ N , we have that
n∑
i=1
xi =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
wijsj =
n∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
wijsj =
n∑
j=1
sj
n∑
i=1
wij =
n∑
j=1
sj. (4.3)
Thus, the sum of all the effective security assets is equal to the sum of all the independent
security assets. The influence matrix therefore signifies the redistribution of security assets.
The independent security asset of a node i is redistributed to all the nodes in the network
that have influence on i (including itself). When a node is down, the node itself and all
the edges connected to it will be removed from the graph. Thus the security loss of the
network will be the node’s effective security asset (instead of its independent security asset).
Conversely, if a node is brought back to the network, it regains its original influence on other
nodes. In either case, the entries of the influence matrix have to be normalized to satisfy
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∑n
i=1wij = 1, ∀j ∈ N . For a quick justification of this linear influence model, consider
a GSM network, where a base station controller (BSC) i controls several base transceiver
stations (BTS), including BTS j. If a BSC fails, all the BTSs connected to it will be out of
service. On the contrary, if only one BTS is compromised, the communication among the
subscribers under other BTSs should not be affected (provided that the rest of the network
is up and running). In such a situation, we can have, for example, wjj = 0.7 and wij = 0.3.
If the BSC is down, there is still an amount of security asset 0.7sj left, even though the BTS
is not in service anymore. The reason is that, if this BTS gets connected to another BSC
(or if the original BSC is up again), they will together create an added security asset for the
network.
From the standpoint of the Attacker, the effective security assets are given by xA = WAsA,
while from the standpoint of the Defender, the effective security assets are given by xD =
WDsD.
A linear influence network for security assets of a three-node network is illustrated in
Figure 4.1. The state diagram of this three-node network is shown in Figure 4.2. The state
space of the system S is given as {S1, S2, . . . , Sp} (p = 2
n) where Sk ∈ {0, 1}
n , k = 1, . . . , p.
Here a node is said to be in state 1 if it is compromised and 0 otherwise. We present in what
follows an example to illustrate the linear influence network model.
1 2
3
w32
w12
w31
w33
w22w11
Figure 4.1: A linear influence network for security assets of a three-node network.
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(0,0,0)
(1,0,0)
(0,0,1)
(1,1,0)
(0,1,1) (0,1,0)
(1,0,1)(1,1,1)
S1 S2 S3S4
S5 S6S7 S8
Figure 4.2: An example state diagram for the network in Figure 4.1. At each stage, the
system can remain in the same state, move to a different state where one node changes its
states, or move to a different state where one healthy node is compromised and one
compromised node is recovered.
Example 4.1. Suppose that we have a network of three nodes with correlations as shown in
Figure 4.3. The influence equation (4.2) can be written as

x
(1)
1
x
(1)
2
x
(1)
3
 =

0.9 0.2 0
0 0.7 0
0.1 0.1 1


s
(1)
1
s
(1)
2
s
(1)
3
 , (4.4)
where we use x
(k)
i and s
(k)
i to respectively denote the effective security asset and independent
security asset of node i at state k. Now suppose that node 1 is compromised; then the
independent security asset of node 3 will remain the same, s
(2)
3 = s
(1)
3 . The independent
security asset of node 2 will be decreased by an amount corresponding to the influence of
node 1 on node 2: s
(2)
2 = s
(1)
2 − 0.2s
(1)
2 = 0.8s
(1)
2 . Also, the influences on each node have to
be normalized to have
∑
iwij = 1. Thus we now have w32 = 1/8 and w22 = 7/8 and the
influence equation becomes  x(2)2
x
(2)
3
 =
 7/8 0
1/8 1
 s(2)2
s
(2)
3
 . (4.5)
Thus we can see x
(2)
2 = (7/8)s
(2)
2 = 0.7s
(1)
2 , x
(2)
3 = (1/8)s
(2)
2 + s
(2)
3 = 0.1s
(1)
2 + s
(1)
3 . In the
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matrix form, we have  x(2)2
x
(2)
3
 =
 0.7 0
0.1 1
 s(1)2
s
(1)
3
 . (4.6)
It can be seen that at this state, the influence matrix W (2) is the original influence matrix
W (2) with row 1 and column 1 removed (or set to zeros). We formally state and prove this
result in Proposition 4.1. After node 1 goes down, the effective security asset of node 2
remains the same, while that of node 3 is decreased by an amount representing its influence
on node 1.
Now if node 3 is in turn compromised, we have a network with one node as in Figure 4.3.
We have s
(6)
2 = s
(2)
2 − s
(2)
2 /8 = (7/8)s
(2)
2 = 0.7s
(1)
2 , and x
(6)
2 = s
(6)
2 .
1
1
1
1
22 2
33
0.9
0.2
0.10.1
0.7
1/8
7/8
Figure 4.3: Changes in a linear influence network for security assets when nodes are
compromised.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that the influence equation of the network at state Sa is given as
x(a) = W (a)s(a). Suppose further that Sb is the state resulting from Sa after node d, d ∈ N
is compromised; the influence matrix at state Sb is given as x
(b) = W (b)s(b), where W (b) is
the matrix resulting from W (a) after the following steps:
• set entries in row d and column d of W (a) to zeros,
• normalize all the columns so that the entries in each column sum up to 1,
and s(b) is the independent security asset vector resulting from s(a) after deducting the in-
fluence of node d, s(b) = (I − diag(Wd))s
(a) (I: n × n identity matrix, diag(Wd): Diagonal
matrix with entries of row d of W (a)). Then we also have x(b) = W
(a)
s(a), where W
(a)
is the
matrix resulting from W (a) after setting row d and column d of W (a) to zeros.
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Proof. Consider the independent security asset of node k, k ∈ N after node d is down. If
k = d, s
(b)
k = 0, as the entries of row d in W
(b) are all zeros. Otherwise, if k 6= d, we have
that s
(b)
k = (1−wdk)s
(a)
k after we deduct the influence of node d. The effective security asset
of node k (k 6= d) at state Sb is then given as
x
(b)
k =
n∑
i=1,i 6=d
w
(b)
ki s
(b)
i (as entries of column d are all zeros)
=
n∑
i=1,i 6=d
w
(a)
ki
1− w(a)dk
s
(b)
i (as entries of each column i have been normalized)
=
n∑
i=1,i 6=d
w
(a)
ki
1− w(a)dk
(1− w(a)dk )s
(a)
k (from above)
=
n∑
i=1,i 6=d
w
(a)
ki s
(a)
i . (4.7)
Thus we can write
x(b) = W
(a)
s(a), (4.8)
where W
(a)
is the matrix resulting from W (a) after setting row d and column d of W (a) to
zeros.
This proposition thus allows us to reuse the original independent security asset vector in
the computation of the effective security assets when the network switches from one state
to another. The only thing that we need to change is the influence matrix.
4.2.2 Linear influence network model for vulnerabilities
We also use the linear influence network model to represent the interdependency of nodes
in terms of vulnerability. In addition to the correlation of security assets, a node’s state
also affects other nodes’ susceptibility to attack and capability to recover from infection.
For example, if a workstation is infected with malware, other workstations connected to
the infected one will be more vulnerable to malware attack. Similarly, if a server in charge
of updating software for a local area network (LAN) is down, it will be more difficult to
recover a workstation on the LAN from the compromised state. Under the framework of
104
stochastic games, this kind of influence is readily incorporated. For instance, in the network
of Example 4.1, if the Attacker attacks node 1, and the Defender decides not to defend this
node, the probability that the system goes from (0, 1, 0) to (1, 1, 0) will be greater than the
probability that the system goes from (0, 0, 0) to (1, 0, 0), if node 2 has some influence on
node 1 in terms of vulnerability. We quantify these effects in a support matrix H, defined
as follows. For eij ∈ Ev,
H =
 hij if eij ∈ Ev0 otherwise, (4.9)
where hij quantifies the support that node i gives node j, 0 ≤ hij ≤ 1 ∀i, j ∈ N . The
support to node j, j ∈ N is given as
hj =
n∑
i=1
hij, (4.10)
where 0 ≤ hj ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ N . In this model, we use a single support matrix for both the
Attacker and the Defender. Unlike the model for security assets, we do not normalize hj after
a node is down. When a node that supports node j is down, hj will decrease, and thus the
probability that node j is compromised under attack (if it is currently healthy) will increase,
and the probability that node j is recovered by the Defender (if it is currently compromised)
decreases. Let us denote by psjA the probability that a healthy node j is compromised at
each state. We assume an affine relationship between psjA and hj as follows:
• If node j is not attacked then psjA = 0.
• If node j is attacked, and the Defender is not defending this node, psjA = p
j
n0 − (p
j
n0 −
pjn1)hj, where p
j
n1 and p
j
n0 are the probabilities that the node is compromised given that
the support is equal to 1 (full support) and 0 (no support), respectively (pjn1 < p
j
n0).
• If node j is attacked, and the Defender is defending this node, psjA = p
j
d0−(p
j
d0−p
j
d1)hj,
where pjd1 and p
j
d0 are the probabilities that the node is compromised given that the
support is equal to 1 and 0, respectively (pjd1 < p
j
d0).
• Also, it is assumed that pjd1 < p
j
n1 and p
j
d0 < p
j
n0.
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Similarly, denote by psjD the probability that a compromised node is brought back to the
healthy state. psjD is computed as follows:
• If node j is not defended then psjD = 0.
• If node j is defended, and the Attacker is not attacking this node, psjD = q
j
n0 + (q
j
n1 −
qjn0)hj, where q
j
n1 and q
j
n0 are the probabilities that the node is recovered given that
the support is equal to 1 (full support) and 0 (no support), respectively (qjn1 > q
j
n0).
• If node j is defended, and the Attacker is attacking this node, psjD = q
j
a0+(q
j
a1−q
j
a0)hj,
where qja1 and q
j
a0 are the probabilities that the node is recovered given that the support
is equal to 1 and 0, respectively (qja1 > q
j
a0).
• Also, it is assumed that qja1 < q
j
n1 and q
j
a0 < q
j
n0.
A weighted directed graph for network vulnerabilities is shown in Figure 4.4.
1 12
3 3
0.90.9
0.2
0.1 0.1
0.7 0.70.5
0.3
Figure 4.4: A linear influence network for vulnerabilities and the changes of supports when
one node is compromised.
4.3 The network security problem as a nonzero-sum stochastic
game
4.3.1 A brief overview of nonzero-sum discounted stochastic games
A brief overview of nonzero-sum stochastic games is given in this subsection [11,51–54]. We
use the term game element Γk, k = 1, . . . , p to refer to the particular game that starts from
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state k. At each stage, a stochastic game can be at one in p states of the state space S =
{S1, S2, . . . Sp} of the game. Each state can be further represented as Sp = {S
n, Sn−1, . . . S1},
where Si is the state of constituent node i. At each state Sk, Player P1 and Player P2 have
at their disposal mk and nk actions, respectively. The instant payoffs at each state are
given by two mk × nk payoff (reward) matrices, whose entries are a
k
ij and b
k
ij, i = 1, . . . ,mk,
j = 1, . . . , nk. At state Sk, if Player P1 chooses action i and Player P2 chooses action j,
Player P1 will get an instant payoff of a
k
ij and Player P2 will get an instant payoff of b
k
ij.
Furthermore, there are probabilities qklij , l = 1, . . . , p, that the next state of the game will be
Sl, where
qklij ≥ 0,
p∑
l=1
qklij = 1, ∀k, i, j. (4.11)
The game thus can revert to a previous state and pass through the state space indefinitely.
In this chapter, we are interested in a class of strategies called stationary strategies. A
stationary strategy for Player P1 is a set of mk-vectors, denoted by y
k, k = 1, . . . , p, where
mk∑
i=1
yki = 1, y
k
i ≥ 0. (4.12)
Here yki is the probability that Player P1 plays action i if he is currently at state Sk. Let
y = (y1, y2, . . . , yp) and and let Y be the set of all such y’s. Similarly, a stationary strategy
for Player P2 is a set of nk-vectors, z
k, where
∑nk
j=1 z
k
j = 1 and z
k
j ≥ 0. Let z = (z
1, z2, . . . , zp)
and let Z be the set of all such z’s.
Let R =
{
(alyz, b
l
yz)|y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z, l ∈ S
}
be the set of expected instant payoffs to Player P1
and Player P2, respectively, if the game is in state l ∈ S and strategies (y, z) are used. Let
Q =
{
qlkyz|y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z, l, k ∈ S
}
be the set of probabilities that the system goes from state l
to state k when strategies (y, z) are used. For both R and Q, we use subscript i for y when
Player P1 uses the action i in state l, and j for z when Player P2 uses action j in state l.
Specifically, aliz is the expected payoff to Player P1 at state l, where Player P1 plays action
i and Player P2 plays mixed strategy z; b
l
yj, q
lk
iz , and q
lk
yj are defined similarly. We then have
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the following relationships:
alyz =
ml∑
i=1
ylia
l
iz , a
l
iz =
nl∑
j=1
zlja
l
ij, (4.13)
blyz =
nl∑
j=1
zljb
l
yj , b
l
yj =
ml∑
i=1
yljb
l
ij. (4.14)
For transition probabilities, we have that
qlkyz =
mk∑
i=1
yliq
lk
iz , q
lk
iz =
nk∑
j=1
zljq
lk
ij . (4.15)
Denote by a
(k)t
yz , b
(k)t
yz the expected payoffs in the tth stage to the Attacker and the Defender,
respectively, for the game element Γk (the game starting from state k), where the Attacker
and the Defender use strategies y and z, respectively. The β-discounted payoffs1 to P1 and
P2 (β ∈ [0, 1)) are given by
Ak(β; y; z) =
∞∑
t=0
βta(k)tyz ,
Bk(β; y; z) =
∞∑
t=0
βtb(k)tyz , (4.16)
where β ∈ [0, 1). A pair of strategies (yˆ ∈ Y, zˆ ∈ Z) constitutes a β-discounted stationary
equilibrium if
Ak(β; yˆ; zˆ) ≥ Ak(β; y; zˆ), (4.17)
Bk(β; yˆ; zˆ) ≥ Bk(β; yˆ; z), (4.18)
k ∈ S, y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z. (4.19)
Thus the equilibrium is the point where no player can improve her own payoff by uni-
laterally changing her strategy. Let vyk = Ak(β; y; z), v
z
k = Bk(β; y; z), and further v
y =
1The analysis for undiscounted stochastic games with positive stop probabilities at each state is similar
[51, 54]. We turn to stochastic games with positive stop probabilities later in this chapter. A note on the
connection between these two classes of stochastic games is given in Subsection 4.4.5.
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(vy1 , v
y
2 , . . . , v
y
p), v
z = (vz1, v
z
2, . . . , v
z
p). The terms v
y and vz are called value vectors for
Player P1 and Player P2, respectively. Also, let vˆ
y
k = Ak(β; yˆ; zˆ), vˆ
z
k = Bk(β; yˆ; zˆ), and
vˆy = (vˆy1 , vˆ
y
2 , . . . , vˆ
y
p), vˆ
z = (vˆz1, vˆ
z
2 , . . . , vˆ
z
p). The terms vˆ
y and vˆz are called equilibrium value
vectors for Player P1 and Player P2, respectively.
4.3.2 A nonzero-sum stochastic game model for security games over
networks of interdependent nodes
In this subsection we formulate the security problem on a network of multiple nodes as
a nonzero-sum stochastic game. This is the nonzero-sum version of the model presented
in [50]. At each state k, k = 1, . . . , p, the Attacker’s pure strategies consist of mk = n + 1
actions, where n is the number of nodes in the network:
• Attack node i, αki , where i = 1, . . . , n.
• Do nothing, αkmk = ∅.
For each k, the Defender’s actions are:
• Defend node i, γki , where i = 1, . . . , n,
• Do nothing, γknk = ∅,
where nk = mk = n+1. For each possible combination of the Attacker’s and the Defender’s
actions, the payoffs for the Attacker and the Defender are the expected values of the security
assets that they gain (a loss of security asset will appear in the payoff with a negative sign).
If the Attacker attacks a node i and the Defender defends node j, where i 6= j, we have the
payoffs as follows:
akij = ps
i
A(α
k
i , γ
k
j )x
A(k)
i − ps
j
D(α
k
i , γ
k
j )x
A(k)
j − c
A
i , (4.20)
bkij = −ps
i
A(α
k
i , γ
k
j )x
D(k)
i + ps
j
D(α
k
i , γ
k
j )x
D(k)
j − c
D
j , (4.21)
where psiA(α
k
i , γ
k
j ) and ps
j
D(α
k
i , γ
k
j ) are the probabilities that node i is compromised and node
j is recovered, respectively, x
A(k)
i , x
D(k)
i , x
A(k)
j , x
D(k)
j are the effective security assets of node
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i and node j at state k, from the standpoints of the Attacker and the Defender, respectively,
and cAi , c
D
j are the attacking cost and defending cost of node i and node j, respectively.
If node i has already been compromised, psiA(α
k
i , γ
k
j ) = 0. Similarly, if node j is currently
healthy, psjD(α
k
i , γ
k
j ) = 0. If the Attacker attacks and the Defender defends the same node,
say, node i, we distinguish two cases: The node is currently healthy and the node is currently
compromised. If node i is healthy, the payoffs are given by
akii = ps
i
A(α
k
i , γ
k
i )x
A(k)
i − c
A
i , (4.22)
bkii = −ps
i
A(α
k
i , γ
k
i )x
D(k)
i − c
D
i . (4.23)
Otherwise, if the node is compromised, the payoffs are given by
akii = −ps
i
D(α
k
i , γ
k
i )x
A(k)
i − c
A
i , (4.24)
bkii = ps
i
D(α
k
i , γ
k
i )x
D(k)
i − c
D
i . (4.25)
The probabilities psiA(α
k
i , γ
k
j ) and ps
j
D(α
k
i , γ
k
j ) are calculated using the guidelines given in
Subsection 4.2.2.
Note that once a node changes its state, the effective security assets and the supports of
all the nodes in the network have to be recalculated as in Example 4.1 and Figure 4.4. As
mentioned in Subsection 4.2.2, the probabilities psiA, ps
i
D, and thus q
kl
ij , are dependent on
the supports to the nodes, and are therefore affected by the correlation in vulnerabilities of
the nodes.
Given pid1, p
i
n1, p
i
d0, p
i
n0, q
j
a1, q
j
n1, q
j
a0, q
j
n0, i, j ∈ N , k = 1, . . . , p, and the support matrix H,
psiA, ps
i
D, and q
kl
ij can be calculated using the equations in Subsection 4.2.2. A numerical
example is provided in Subsection 4.3.4.
4.3.3 Solving the stochastic game using nonlinear programming
We present in this subsection some analytical results for the game given in 4.3.2, based
on nonzero-sum stochastic game theory [52–54]. Proposition 4.2 states the existence of an
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equilibrium for stationary strategies.
Proposition 4.2. [52] In the nonzero-sum stochastic game given in 4.3.2, there exist x, y,
vˆy, vˆz such that
vˆyk ≥ Ak(β; y; zˆ),
vˆzk ≥ Bk(β; yˆ; z),
k ∈ S, y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z. (4.26)
Proposition 4.3. [52] In the nonzero-sum stochastic game given in 4.3.2, there exists
exactly one vector vˆ = (vˆy, vˆz) that satisfies (4.26).
Note that only the value vector vˆ = (vˆy, vˆz) is unique; the equilibrium strategies are not
necessarily unique.
The following theorem is a 2-player version of Theorem 2.1 from [53]. This theorem helps
solve the nonzero-sum stochastic game given in 4.3.2 using a nonlinear program (NLP).
Theorem 4.1. [53] Let vˆys , vˆ
z
s , s ∈ S, and (yˆ, zˆ) be given. The pair of strategies (yˆ, zˆ)
constitutes a β-discounted Nash equilibrium where the equilibrium payoffs are (vˆys , vˆ
z
s) if and
only if the variables vˆys , vˆ
z
s , yˆ, zˆ are a global minimum of the following nonlinear program (the
objective value at the global minimum will be zero).
Minimize
∑
l∈S
[
(vyl − a
l
yz − β
∑
k∈S
vykq
lk
yz) + (v
z
l − b
l
yz − β
∑
k∈S
vzkq
lk
yz)
]
,
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subject to
(i.a) vyl ≥ a
l
iz + β
∑
k∈S
vykq
lk
iz , ∀l ∈ S,
(i.b) vzl ≥ b
l
yj + β
∑
k∈S
vzkq
lk
yj, ∀l ∈ S,
(ii.a)
ml∑
i=1
yil = 1, ∀l ∈ S,
(ii.b)
nl∑
j=1
zjl = 1, ∀l ∈ S,
(iii.a) yil ≥ 0, i = 1 . . . ml, ∀l ∈ S,
(iii.b) zjl ≥ 0, j = 1 . . . nl, ∀l ∈ S. (4.27)
4.3.4 A numerical example for β-discounted stochastic games
In this subsection, we present a numerical example for our model with a network with three
nodes. We use the same influence matrix for the Attacker and the Defender; the influence
matrix and the support matrix are taken from Section 4.2. The influence equations are given
as follows:

x
A(1)
1
x
A(1)
2
x
A(1)
3
 =

0.9 0.2 0
0 0.7 0
0.1 0.1 1


30
20
30
 =

31
14
35
 , (4.28)

x
D(1)
1
x
D(1)
2
x
D(1)
3
 =

0.9 0.2 0
0 0.7 0
0.1 0.1 1


20
30
40
 =

24
21
45
 , (4.29)
and the support matrix is given by (Figure 4.4)
H =

0.7 0 0
0.2 0.5 0
0.1 0.3 0.9
 . (4.30)
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In this example, we assume cAn = c
A = 10, cDn = c
D = 5 ∀n ∈ N , and β = 0.7. We use
uniform cost for each player to emphasize the resource allocation aspect of the problem.
Finally, pjd1 = 0.1, p
j
n1 = 0.3, p
j
d0 = 0.2, p
j
n0 = 0.4, q
j
a0 = 0.1, q
j
a1 = 0.2, q
j
n0 = 0.3, and
qjn1 = 0.4, ∀j ∈ N .
For example, suppose the system is at S1 (0, 0, 0). The next state could be one in
{S1 (0, 0, 0), S2 (0, 0, 1), S3 (0, 1, 0), S5 (1, 0, 0)}. The Attacker’s actions include attack-
ing node 1, node 2, node 3, and doing nothing. Similarly, the Defender’s actions include
defending node 1, node 2, node 3, and doing nothing. When the Attacker attacks node 1
and the Defender defends the same node, using the above results, we have that
a111 = ps
1
A(α
1
1, γ
1
1)x
A(1)
1 − c
A
1 = −6.9,
b111 = −ps
1
A(α
1
1, γ
1
1)x
D(1)
1 − c
D
1 = −7.4,
q1111 = (1− ps
1
A(α
1
1, γ
1
1) = 0.9,
q1511 = ps
1
A(α
1
1, γ
1
1) = 0.1,
q1j11 = 0 ∀j 6= 1, 5,
where ps1A(α
1
1, γ
1
1) = pd0 − (pd0 − pd1)1 = pd1 = 0.1, as at this state, node 1 still has full
support. Now, suppose that the system is at S5 (1, 0, 0). If the Attacker attacks node 2
and the Defender defends node 1, the next state could be one in {S1 (0, 0, 0), S3 (0, 1, 0),
S5 (1, 0, 0), S7 (1, 1, 0)}. We then have that
a521 = ps
2
A(α
5
2, γ
5
1)x
A(5)
2 − ps
1
D(α
5
2, γ
5
1)x
A(1)
1 − c
A
2 = −14.63,
b521 = −ps
2
A(α
5
2, γ
5
1)x
D(5)
2 + ps
1
D(α
5
2, γ
5
1)x
D(1)
1 − c
D
1 = −5.48,
q5121 = (1− ps
2
A(α
5
2, γ
5
1))ps
1
D(α
5
2, γ
5
1) = 0.2244,
q5521 = (1− ps
2
A(α
5
2, γ
5
1))(1− ps
1
D(α
5
2, γ
5
1)) = 0.4556,
q5321 = ps
2
A(α
5
2, γ
5
1)ps
1
D(α
5
2, γ
5
1) = 0.1056,
q5721 = ps
2
A(α
5
2, γ
5
1)(1− ps
1
D(α
5
2, γ
5
1)) = 0.2144,
q5j21 = 0 ∀j 6= 1, 3, 5, 7,
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where ps2A(α
5
2, γ
5
1) = p
2
d0− (p
2
d0− p
2
d1)0.8 = 0.32, as at this state, node 2 has a support of 0.8,
and ps1D(α
5
2, γ
5
1) = q
1
n0 + (q
1
n1 − q
1
n0)0.3 = 0.33, as node 1 has support 0.3 in this state. Note
that the security assets that the Defender will gain and the Attacker will lose if node 1 is
recovered are x
D(1)
1 and x
A(1)
1 instead of x
D(5)
1 and x
A(5)
1 . The reason is that the state of the
system will be state 1 after node 1 is recovered.
Other entries of other game elements can be calculated in a similar way. Using the NLP
in (4.27), we can then compute the optimal strategies and the payoffs for each player. We
solve the NLP numerically using Matlab. The optimal strategies of the Attacker and the
Defender, and their payoffs, are given in Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. As can be seen from
Table 4.1, for example, when all the nodes are up and running, the Attacker wants to attack
node 3 with probability 1, while the Defender does not want to defend. Recall that the
effective security assets of nodes 1, 2, and 3 to the Attacker at this state are 31, 14, and 35,
respectively. The Defender has to take into account the expected loss (from node 3’s security
asset and the probability that the Attacker can compromise this node) and the defending
cost. In state 3 (0, 1, 0), the Attacker wants to attack node 1, attack node 3, and rest with
probabilities 0.52, 0.39, and 0.09, respectively. In this state, the Defender’s optimal strategy
will be defending node 2 and rest with probabilities 0.58 and 0.42, respectively. It is worth
noting that the mixed strategies for the players can also be interpreted as the way to allocate
their resources in the security game.
It is interesting to see that the value of the game starting from state 1 (vˆy1) to the Attacker
is positive. It can be seen that from state 1, a strategy that yields value 0 to the Attacker (no
matter what the Defender does) is to rest all the time. Thus vˆy1 ≥ 0. This is not necessarily
true for vˆyk , k 6= 1. Similarly, we have that vˆ
z
8 ≥ 0, as from this state the Defender can rest
all the time to have payoff 0.
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Table 4.1: Optimal strategies for the Attacker at each state of the game.
State Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Do nothing
1 (0, 0, 0) 0 0 1 0
2 (0, 0, 1) 0 0 0 1
3 (0, 1, 0) 0.52 0 0.39 0.09
4 (0, 1, 1) 0 0 0 1
5 (1, 0, 0) 0 0 0 1
6 (1, 0, 1) 0 0 0 1
7 (1, 1, 0) 0 0 0 1
8 (1, 1, 1) 0 0 0 1
Table 4.2: Optimal strategies for the Defender each state of the game.
State Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Do nothing
1 (0, 0, 0) 0 0 0 1
2 (0, 0, 1) 0 0 1 0
3 (0, 1, 0) 0 0.58 0 0.42
4 (0, 1, 1) 0 0 1 0
5 (1, 0, 0) 1 0 0 0
6 (1, 0, 1) 0 0 1 0
7 (1, 1, 0) 0 1 0 0
8 (1, 1, 1) 0 0 1 0
Table 4.3: The payoffs of the Attacker and the Defender for each game element.
GE 1 2 3 4
Attacker’s 14.92 −14.44 −1.56 −20.05
Defender’s −19.19 18.57 −8.10 21.37
GE 5 6 7 8
Attacker’s −13.28 −24.59 −16.65 −24.50
Defender’s 6.57 28.44 19.17 31.42
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4.4 The network security problem as a zero-sum stochastic game
4.4.1 A brief overview of zero-sum undiscounted stochastic games
We briefly introduce an undiscounted stochastic game with a positive stop probability at
each state of the game [11,51]. Each game element now can be written as
φkij = a
k
ij +
p∑
l=1
qklijΓl, (4.31)
ψkij = b
k
ij +
p∑
l=1
qklijΓl, (4.32)
where
qklij ≥ 0, l = 1, . . . , p, i = 1, . . . ,mk, j = 1, . . . , nk,
p∑
l=1
qklij < 1, ∀k, i, j. (4.33)
Expression (4.31) can be interpreted as follows.
At game element k, if Player P1 chooses pure strategy i and Player P2 chooses pure
strategy j, Player P1 and Player P2 will get instant payoffs of a
k
ij and b
k
ij, respectively.
Furthermore, there is a probability qklij that both players have to play game element Γl next,
and a probability
qk0ij = 1−
p∑
l=1
qklij (4.34)
that the game will end. Unlike the payoff formulation of the games in 4.16, the accumulated
payoffs are now undiscounted:
Ak(y; z) =
∞∑
t=0
a(k)tyz ,
Bk(y; z) =
∞∑
t=0
b(k)tyz . (4.35)
With condition (4.11), the probability of infinite play is guaranteed to be zero, and the
expected payoffs of Player P1 and Player P2, which are accumulated through all the stages
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of the game, are finite [11].
We hereinafter examine the zero-sum version of these undiscounted games, where bkij =
−akij ∀k, i, j. At game element k, if Player P1 chooses pure strategy i and Player P2 chooses
pure strategy j, Player P2 has to pay Player P1 an amount a
k
ij. In the rest of this section, for
the sake of simplicity, we only write the payoff formulation for Player P1 and suppress that of
Player P2 when possible. Suppose that we are given value of the game v
y = (vy1 , v
y
2 , . . . , v
y
p),
or for simplicity, v = (v1, v2, . . . , vp). At state k, the players are faced with an mk × nk
zero-sum matrix game. The entries of the payoff matrix Ck are given as
ckij = a
k
ij +
p∑
l=1
qklij vl, k, l = 1, . . . , p, i = 1, . . . ,mk, j = 1, . . . , nk, (4.36)
where vl is the value (in mixed strategies) of the matrix game Cl, or
vl = val(Cl), l = 1, . . . , p. (4.37)
4.4.2 A zero-sum stochastic game model for network security
In this subsection we formulate the security problem on a multi-node network as a zero-sum
stochastic game with positive stop probabilities at each state. To make the model fit into
the framework of zero-sum games, we make further assumptions as follows:
Assumption 4.1. (Assumptions for zero-sum stochastic games with positive stop probabil-
ities)
• The influence matrices for the Attacker and the Defender are the same, WA = WD =
W .
• The vectors of independent assets are the same for the Attacker and the Defender,
sA = sD = s.
• The costs of attacking and defending are both zero2, cAn = c
A
n = 0, ∀n ∈ N .
2The costs of attacking and defending can still be included in the payoff formulation of a zero-sum game
if we consider the cost to a player to be the gain to the other player. We however assume zero costs here,
just for the sake of simplicity.
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• At each state k of the game, for every pair of actions of the players, there is a probability
pke ∈ (0, 1) that the game will end (which means the Defender has detected the Attacker
and stopped him from further intruding).
The payoff formulation is adopted from Subsection 4.3.2 where we suppress the subscript
and superscript A (for the Attacker) and D (for the Defender) when possible. If the Attacker
attacks a node i and the Defender defends node j, where i 6= j, we have the payoffs as follows:
akij = (1− p
k
e)
[
psiA(α
k
i , γ
k
j )x
(k)
i − ps
j
D(α
k
i , γ
k
j )x
(k)
j
]
, (4.38)
bkij = (1− p
k
e)
[
−psiA(α
k
i , γ
k
j )x
(k)
i + ps
j
D(α
k
i , γ
k
j )x
(k)
j
]
. (4.39)
If node i has already been compromised, psiA(α
k
i , γ
k
j ) = 0. Similarly, if node j is currently
healthy, psjD(α
k
i , γ
k
j ) = 0. If the Attacker attacks and the Defender defends the same node,
say, node i, we distinguish two cases: the node is currently healthy and the node is currently
compromised. If node i is healthy, the payoffs are given by
akii = (1− p
k
e)
[
psiA(α
k
i , γ
k
i )x
A(k)
i
]
, (4.40)
bkii = (1− p
k
e)
[
−psiA(α
k
i , γ
k
i )x
D(k)
i
]
. (4.41)
Otherwise, if the node is compromised, the payoffs are given by
akii = (1− p
k
e)
[
−psiD(α
k
i , γ
k
i )x
A(k)
i
]
, (4.42)
bkii = (1− p
k
e)
[
psiD(α
k
i , γ
k
i )x
D(k)
i
]
. (4.43)
The probabilities psiA(α
k
i , γ
k
j ) and ps
j
D(α
k
i , γ
k
j ) are calculated using the guidelines given in
Subsection 4.2.2.
4.4.3 Existence, uniqueness, and computation of the solution
We present in this subsection some analytical results for the game given in 4.4.2, based on
zero-sum stochastic game theory [11], [51].
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Proposition 4.4. In the zero-sum stochastic game given in 4.4.2, the probability of infinite
play is zero and the expected payoff of the Attacker (which is also the expected cost of the
Defender) is finite.
Proof. We first prove that the model in 4.4.2 forms a discrete-time discrete-state Markov
chain. Without considering the relationship of the nodes in terms of security assets and
vulnerabilities, the state of the network (as shown in Figure 4.1) is clearly a discrete-state
Markov chain. Also, we consider in this work a discrete-time formulation where the state
of each node is updated at sampling times. Now, let us take into account the correlation
of security assets and vulnerabilities. First, for the influence matrix, at each state of the
network, if some nodes are down, the corresponding rows and columns will become all-zero
vectors, and the entries in each column will be normalized to sum to 1. Similarly, the
corresponding rows and columns of the support matrix will be zeroed out. Thus, it can be
seen that, given the full influence and support matrices at the beginning (state 1, where all
nodes are up and running), the current influence and support matrices only depend on the
current state of the network. Therefore, the whole model forms a discrete-time discrete-state
Markov chain.
Now, with the setup in 4.4.2, we can prove that qk0ij = 1 −
∑p
l=1 q
kl
ij > 0, ∀k and ∀ i, j of
each game element k. Thus the proposition is proved using the results of stochastic game
theory.
Proposition 4.5. (Theorem V.3.3 [11]) In the zero-sum stochastic game given in 4.4.2,
there exists exactly one vector v = (v1, v2, . . . , vp) that satisfies (4.36) and (4.37).
Using the results from 4.4.1, we can compute the NE of the game, which is a pair of mixed
strategies for the Attacker and for the Defender at each state, and the expected payoff of
the Attacker (or the expected cost of the Defender).
Proposition 4.6. (Theorem V.3.3 [11]) The vector v = (v1, v2, . . . , vp) that satisfies (4.36)
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and (4.37) can be derived through the following recursive equations:
v0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0), (4.44)
ckrij = a
k
ij +
p∑
l=1
qklij v
r
l , r = 0, 1, 2 . . . (4.45)
vr+1k = val(C
r
k). (4.46)
We can stop the recursion at a desired level of accuracy and then use the current value of
vector v = (v1, v2, . . . , vp) to compute Ck using (4.36). The mixed strategies of the players at
each game element Γk are the NE in mixed strategies of the matrix game Ck. The strategies
so obtained will converge to optimal stationary strategies to the stochastic game.
4.4.4 A numerical example for zero-sum undiscounted stochastic games
We use the same network in 4.3.4 with assumptions 4.1. We further assume that pje = 0.3.
The influence equation for both players is given by

x
(1)
1
x
(1)
2
x
(1)
3
 =

0.9 0.2 0
0 0.7 0
0.1 0.1 1


20
30
40
 =

24
21
45
 , (4.47)
and the support matrix is given by (Figure 4.4)
H =

0.7 0 0
0.2 0.5 0
0.1 0.3 0.9
 . (4.48)
We use the same following probabilities pjd1 = 0.1, p
j
n1 = 0.3, p
j
d0 = 0.2, p
j
n0 = 0.4,
qja0 = 0.1, q
j
a1 = 0.2, q
j
n0 = 0.3, and q
j
n1 = 0.4, ∀j ∈ N . Also, p
j
e = 0.3, ∀j ∈ N . In
what follows, only the payoffs of the Attacker are given; those of the Defender always satisfy
bkij = −a
k
ij, ∀k, i, j.
When the Attacker attacks node 1 and the Defender defends the same node, using the
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above results, we have that
a111 = (1− p
1
e)ps
1
A(α
1
1, γ
1
1)x
(1)
1 = 1.68,
q1111 = (1− p
1
e)(1− ps
1
A(α
1
1, γ
1
1) = 0.63,
q1511 = (1− p
1
e)ps
1
A(α
1
1, γ
1
1) = 0.07,
q1j11 = 0 ∀j 6= 1, 5,
where ps1A(α
1
1, γ
1
1) = pd0 − (pd0 − pd1)1 = pd1 = 0.1, as at this state, node 1 still has full
support. Now, suppose that the system is at S5 (1, 0, 0). If the Attacker attacks node 2
and the Defender defends node 1, the next state could be one in { S1 (0, 0, 0), S3 (0, 1, 0),
S5 (1, 0, 0), S7 (1, 1, 0) }. We then have that
a521 = (1− p
1
e)
[
ps2A(α
5
2, γ
5
1)x
A(5)
2 − ps
1
D(α
5
2, γ
5
1)x
A(1)
1
]
= 0.336,
q5121 = (1− p
1
e)(1− ps
2
A(α
5
2, γ
5
1))ps
1
D(α
5
2, γ
5
1) = 0.1571,
q5321 = (1− p
1
e)ps
2
A(α
5
2, γ
5
1)ps
1
D(α
5
2, γ
5
1) = 0.0739,
q5521 = (1− p
1
e)(1− ps
2
A(α
5
2, γ
5
1))(1− ps
1
D(α
5
2, γ
5
1)) = 0.3189,
q5721 = (1− p
1
e)ps
2
A(α
5
2, γ
5
1)(1− ps
1
D(α
5
2, γ
5
1)) = 0.1501,
q5j21 = 0 ∀j 6= 1, 3, 5, 7,
where ps2A(α
5
2, γ
5
1) = p
2
d0− (p
2
d0− p
2
d1)0.8 = 0.32, as at this state, node 2 has a support of 0.8,
and ps1D(α
5
2, γ
5
1) = q
1
n0 + (q
1
n1 − q
1
n0)0.3 = 0.33, as node 1 has support 0.3 in this state.
Other entries of other game elements can be calculated in a similar way. Using the recursive
procedure given in Proposition 4.6, we can then compute the optimal strategy of each player
and the value of the game. The optimal strategies of the Attacker and the Defender, and
the value vector are given in Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6.
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Table 4.4: Optimal strategies for the Attacker at each state of the zero-sum game.
State Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Do nothing
1 (0, 0, 0) 0.35 0.42 0.23 0
2 (0, 0, 1) 1 0 0 0
3 (0, 1, 0) 0.01 0 0.99 0
4 (0, 1, 1) 0.51 0 0.49 0
5 (1, 0, 0) 0 0 1 0
6 (1, 0, 1) 0 1 0 0
7 (1, 1, 0) 0 0 1 0
8 (1, 1, 1) 0 0.43 0.57 0
Table 4.5: Optimal strategies for the Defender each state of the zero-sum game.
State Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Do nothing
1 (0, 0, 0) 0.22 0.07 0.71 0
2 (0, 0, 1) 0 0 1 0
3 (0, 1, 0) 0 0.24 0.76 0
4 (0, 1, 1) 0 0.07 0.93 0
5 (1, 0, 0) 1 0 0 0
6 (1, 0, 1) 0 0 1 0
7 (1, 1, 0) 0 1 0 0
8 (1, 1, 1) 0 0.54 0.46 0
Table 4.6: The payoffs of the Attacker and the Defender for each game element of zero-sum
game.
GE 1 2 3 4
Attacker’s 11.77 −3.08 7.19 −6.96
Defender’s −11.77 3.08 −7.19 6.96
GE 5 6 7 8
Attacker’s 7.49 −3.72 2.82 −11.24
Defender’s −7.49 3.72 −2.82 11.24
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4.4.5 Connection between β-discounted games and undiscounted games
with positive stop probabilities
We have mentioned earlier in this chapter that the analyses for β-discounted games and
undiscounted games with positive stop probabilities are similar [51,54]. As mentioned in [51],
a nonzero-sum game with positive stop probabilities can be fit into the framework of β-
discounted games. In this subsection, we elaborate on this remark. Consider the nonzero-
sum stochastic game with positive stop probabilities:
φkij = a
k
ij +
p∑
l=1
qklijΓl,
ψkij = b
k
ij +
p∑
l=1
qklijΓl, (4.49)
where
qklij ≥ 0, l = 1, . . . , p, i = 1, . . . ,mk, j = 1, . . . , nk,
p∑
l=1
qklij < 1, ∀k, i, j. (4.50)
Letting qk0ij = 1 −
∑p
l=1 q
kl
ij = λ, ∀k, i, j, we then have that λ ∈ (0, 1]. We can then rewrite
(4.49) as
φkij = a
k
ij + (1− λ)
p∑
l=1
qklij
1− λ
Γl,
ψkij = b
k
ij + (1− λ)
p∑
l=1
qklij
1− λ
Γl. (4.51)
It can be seen that
∑p
l=1
qklij
1−λ
= 1. Thus the equations in (4.51) represent a (1−λ)-discounted
stochastic game. In other words, a β-discounted stochastic game is equivalent to a stochastic
game with (1 − β) stop probability ∀k, i, j, with the same set of instant payoffs R, and all
the transition probabilities scaled by a factor of β.
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4.5 Conclusion to the chapter
In this chapter we have proposed a new network model based on linear influence networks
to represent the interdependency of nodes in terms of security assets and vulnerabilities.
The optimal solution obtained allows one to comprehend the behavior of a rational attacker,
as well as to provide IDSs with guidelines on how to allocate their resources. The game
formulation is general enough to address the difference in security asset valuation of the
Attacker and the Defender, as well as the costs of attacking and defending. The optimal
solution we have obtained provides the players with a guideline on how to allocate their
resources at each state of the game. This model includes two commonly seen special cases:
the game where one player optimizes its strategy given that the other player plays a fixed
strategy (Markov decision process), and the static bimatrix game over a multi-node network.
We have examined both discounted stochastic games and undiscounted stochastic games
with positive stop probabilities at each state. The zero-sum model presented in 4.4.2 can
also be solved using the NLP in (4.27). We have however still included it in this chapter as
it comes with a simple algorithm (the iterative algorithm presented in Proposition 4.6) to
solve for the Nash equilibrium.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, we have presented some decision and game-theoretic analyses and designs
for network security. We have first examined the decentralized attack detection problem
where sensors’ observations are conditionally correlated. We have established the existence
of the optimal solutions for the Bayesian and Neyman-Pearson formulations. We have also
derived an iterative method to find the optimal strategies for the sensors when they are
restricted to threshold rules based on likelihood ratios. In situations where distributions
of parameters are given as probability mass functions, we have provided an enumeration
method to search for the optimal thresholds. This search algorithm has been applied to the
KDD dataset 1999 to detect attacks from regular connections.
We have then examined the repeated game over a network, where players do not have
knowledge of each other’s motivation (payoff matrix). The learning process is based on the
fictitious play mechanism. In the cases when the game suffers from decision and observation
errors, we have quantified the deviation of players’ equilibrium strategies from the original
Nash equilibrium of the static game. We have applied a fictitious play algorithm in the push-
back defense against DDoS attacks and observed the convergence to a Nash equilibrium of
the static game.
We have finally proposed a new network model based on linear influence networks to
represent the interdependency of nodes in terms of security assets and vulnerabilities. The
optimal solution obtained allows one to comprehend the behavior of a rational attacker,
as well as to provide IDSs with guidelines on how to allocate their resources. The game
formulation is general enough to address the difference in security asset valuation of the
Attacker and the Defender, as well as the costs of attacking and defending. The optimal
solution we have obtained provides the players with a guideline on how to allocate their
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resources at each state of the game.
These analyses and designs thus cover multiple components of the decision and resource
allocation process in a network intrusion detection and prevention system (IDPS). We remark
however that game theoretic approaches by themselves are not the cure for all network
security problems. They only help with decision making and resource allocation mechanisms;
security measures specifically designed for each kind of the attack are still needed.
It can also be seen that game-theoretic approaches require well-defined payoff formulations
and probabilities of events. First, each player has to be able to value the security assets that
she is fighting for and the cost of defending/attacking (e.g., computational cost, energy).
The payoffs for each pair of actions are also dependent on how likely an outcome will be.
In stochastic games, the probabilities of transition from one state of the game to another
are also needed to solve the games. Estimation of these parameters, which we generally
do not address in this thesis, is by itself a collection of challenging research problems. We
note however that in practical situations where complete information on these parameters
is not available, some estimation method can be employed to approximate a parameter. For
example, in a mobile ad hoc network, if we have to value the security asset of a random
node, we can use the prior distribution of all types of nodes that we may come across and
the security asset of each type.
There are many possible extensions to the analysis and designs we have presented in this
dissertation. For decentralized attack detection, more dynamic and robust models can be
studied. Machine learning techniques can be used for the sensors and the fusion center to
learn the prior distributions and the conditional joint distributions of the parameters along
the way. Sequential hypothesis testing with conditionally correlated observations also has
many applications in network security and is an intriguing research direction. We can also
examine the robustness of the detection algorithms when the observations do not closely
follow the distributions used to compute the optimal strategies, or when several sensors are
out of service or compromised by attackers.
In the research on fictitious play for network security, several more complex scenarios can
be addressed. First, we can examine the situations where the control messages (the decisions)
and the observations get lost or delayed. Second, one may be interested in extending the
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action spaces of the players. For two-player zero-sum classical FP, the convergence proof
was obtained for an arbitrary (but finite) number of actions for each player (m×n) [25], and
therefore the analysis in this work can be extended accordingly. For non-zero-sum games,
the proofs for two-player FP have been found for the case where one player is restricted to 2
actions (see [27] for classical FP and [28] for stochastic FP). It is worth noting that there are
counterexamples (e.g., for 3 × 3 games) where FP does not converge to the mixed strategy
NE [30].
For the part on stochastic games, one intriguing extension is to study the game where the
players do not have complete knowledge of the network and the correlation of the nodes.
Furthermore, when the number of states and the number of actions for each player at each
state increase, the number of variables in the nonlinear program will grow and the com-
putation may become intractable. Studying the complexity of these problems is thus an
important extension. We can also explore approaches to reduce the state space of the game.
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